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Discovery of Expert Witnesses: Amending Rule 
26(b)(4)(E) to Limit Expert Fee Shifting and Reduce 
Litigation Abuses 
Danielle M. Shelton† 
The federal expert witness discovery rule makes sense in theory: it 
provides for robust discovery of a testifying expert’s opinions while 
requiring the opposing party to pay for the expenses related to its discovery 
of those opinions, namely payment for the expert’s deposition.  In practice, 
though, the rule was not well-drafted and is fraught with problems that make 
it unfair and inefficient. 
First, the expert discovery rule strikes the wrong balance, which results 
in the opposing party being forced to pay excessive amounts for the expert’s 
work.  Second, the expert discovery rule is vague and its contours are 
unclear.  This is particularly troubling because fee shifting of any kind is 
almost unheard of in the federal courts, and in the rare occasions in which 
it is mandated, such as for e-discovery, there exist clear procedures and 
safeguards.‡  Not so, however, in the context of fee shifting for expert 
discovery expenses.  The rule is unclear and district courts disagree about 
basic questions arising under the rule: Are an expert’s fees for traveling to 
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‡ Even with such safeguards, the high costs of e-discovery, combined with the shifting of such 
costs to the opposing party, can be daunting and discourage litigants from litigating in federal 
court.  See David J. Cook, Mutiny on the Fee Bounty: Redrafting Fee Clauses in the Age of 
Trump, 17 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 57, 88 n.67 (2016) (“[D]iscovery costs, particularly related 
to ESI discovery, are partly responsible for making federal litigation ‘procedurally more 
complex, risky to prosecute, and very expensive,’ causing litigants to avoid litigating in 
federal court.”) (citing Gregory P. Joseph, Trial Balloon: Federal Litigation-Where Did It Go 
Off Track?, 34 LITIG. 5, 62 (2008)). 
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and from a deposition included in the rule?  Can an expert charge a higher 
hourly rate for his deposition time than he charged the retaining attorney?  
Can the expert make the other party pay in advance or refuse to sit for his 
deposition?  What is the court’s role in ensuring that only reasonable fees 
are shifted despite the rule’s automatic nature?  And because these issues 
play out almost exclusively at the federal district court level and never reach 
the appellate courts, these questions have no consistent or uniform answers, 
despite having been litigated in district courts for almost twenty-five years. 
None of this makes sense given the enduring and increasing role that 
experts play in federal litigation.  The expert fee shifting rule must be fixed 
so that the opposing party only has to pay fees for work that it controls and 
from which it benefits, and then only at a rate that is justified.  Further, the 
rule must be amended to provide clarity about the categories of fees that are 
shifted as well as the process for shifting fees.  Expert discovery is far too 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
While expert witnesses have long been a staple of federal litigation, 
their use and related expenses are increasing.1  One such expense arises in 
the area of expert discovery.2  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(E), 
 
 1  See Lance L. Shea, Ronn B. Kreps & Olufemi O. Solade, An Indispensable Force of 
Persuasion: Navigating Expert Discovery, 2010 FOR THE DEFENSE 14, 15 (“Expert witnesses 
play an increasingly common and crucial role in litigation today.”). 
 2  Over fifteen years ago, one commentator critiqued the high fees charged by experts 
and the impact such fees have on the legal system: 
The sky has really become the limit.  For example, in some cases medical 
experts are now demanding hourly rates of $700, $800, or even $1,000 or 
more per hour for deposition testimony.  Although such fees are usually 
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which addresses discovery of expert opinions, provides that “[u]nless 
manifest injustice would result, the court must require that the party seeking 
discovery . . . pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to 
discovery.”3  In other words, if a party wants to depose the opposing expert, 
it has to pay to do so.  While this sort of fee shifting is seemingly 
straightforward, the rule is fraught with problems. 
Many of these problems arise from the rule’s lack of clarity—what, for 
example, does “time spent responding to discovery” mean and what 
differentiates “reasonable fees” from unreasonable fees?  Other problems 
arise from the rule’s failure to address key questions that arise under it, 
including when fees are due and the logistics of fee shifting.  Finally, some 
problems with the rule arise from its overbreadth, which results in experts’ 
fees shifting to an opponent without justification. 
These shortcomings of the expert discovery rule have real 
consequences for litigants and courts.  Not only is the use of experts a 
mainstay of federal litigation,4 discovery—and, in particular, depositions—
of such experts is likewise routine.5  Unlike lay witnesses who are paid only 
a nominal witness fee per day for their depositions regardless of their 
profession,6 experts are expensive and are paid professional rates.  With 
typical rates that often exceed $500 per hour and reach upwards of $1000 
 
excessive, sometimes these rates are paid, thereby perpetuating the notion 
that it is the expert, and not the judicial system, that controls such fees. 
Mark Canepa, Drawing the Line on Excessive Expert Witness Fees, MONDAQ, 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/10024/Drawing+The+Line+On+Excessive+Expert+
Witness+Fees (last updated Jan. 31, 2001). 
 3  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(E). 
 4  See Andrew W. Jurs, Expert Prevalence, Persuasion, and Price: What Trial 
Participants Really Think About Experts, 91 IND. L.J. 353, 359 (2016) (“To recap, studies 
have found that experts appear in between 63% and 86% of cases, with studies in the 1990s 
showing between 4.1 and 4.8 experts per case and the newest study in 2005 finding 3.6 experts 
per case.”). 
 5  See Amendments to the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 639 (1993) 
(addressing the right to take the opposing expert’s deposition and stating that the report 
disclosure requirement “may . . . eliminate the need for some such depositions or at least 
reduce the length of the depositions”).  
 6  See Hillmann v. City of Chicago, No. 04 C 6671, 2017 WL 3521098, at *10 (N.D. Ill. 
Aug. 16, 2017) (“‘The witness fee specified in § 1920(3) is defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1821,’ 
which provides that witnesses who travel to testify at trial or sit for a deposition must be paid 
an ‘attendance fee’ of $40 per day and must be reimbursed for their travel and related 
expenses.”) (first citing 28 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1), (b)–(c)(1), (c)(3)–(d)(1) (2012); and then 
citing Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 440 (1987)).  
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per hour7—or even “$12,000 per day”8 for experts that charge a flat fee—the 
stakes are high for the opposing party to whom expert discovery fees are 
shifted.9  The already high-stakes of expert fee shifting is made even more 
costly, and even unfair, by the rule’s shortcomings.  And because these 
problems play out exclusively at the district court level, these shortcomings 
have not been resolved at the appellate level. 
This Article explores the myriad ways in which the expert discovery 
rule falls short of its purpose and the ways in which it should be improved.  
Part II discusses the existing rule, focusing on its key provisions, scope, and 
purposes, and the larger procedural framework in which it operates.  Part III 
addresses the various and conflicting ways in which courts have interpreted 
and applied the rule’s key provisions.  Part IV addresses the negative 
implications of the current rule that arise from its ambiguity and the balance 
it strikes in favor of excessive fee shifting.  Part V proposes amendments to 
the rule that would minimize these problems and result in a rule that better 
serves the purposes behind expert fee shifting.  Many of these problems can 
be solved by adding clarity and content to the rule, with the remaining 
problems lessened by adding certain guidelines and presumptions into the 
rule. 
II.  THE BASICS OF THE EXPERT FEE SHIFTING RULE 
A. Rule 26: Expert Discovery Obligations in General 
The expert fee shifting provision is contained within Rule 26.  Not only 
does Rule 26 broadly address litigants’ discovery disclosures in general, it 
includes several provisions relating exclusively to discovery-related 
obligations for expert witnesses.10  That the expert fee shifting rule arises in 
 
 7  See Victoria Negron, Expert Witness Fee Report: Facts, Figures & Trends in 2017, 
EXPERT INST. (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.theexpertinstitute.com/expert-witness-fee-report-
facts-figures-trends-in-2017/ (surveying expert witnesses nationwide “across all industries 
and areas of practice” and finding average deposition fees of $444.31 (Northeast), $407.51 
(South), $415.20 (Midwest), and $380.05 (West)). 
 8  EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 5481 LBS AJP, 1999 WL 32909, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1999) (retaining party demanded payment of $12,000 for one day of 
deposition testimony by its expert). 
 9  It is not uncommon for the deposing party to have to pay six figures for the privilege 
of deposing the other side’s expert.  See, e.g., Neutral Tandem, Inc. v. Peerless Network, Inc., 
No. 08 C 3402, 2011 WL 13199213, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2011) (awarding “a total of 
$48,020.00, pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(E)” for two experts’ depositions). 
 10  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, entitled “Duty to Disclose; General Provisions 
Governing Discovery,” is divided into two parts: (a) “Required Disclosures” and (b) 
“Discovery Scope and Limits.”  Expert testimony is addressed in both parts.  Part (a) 
addresses, among other things, the “Disclosure of Expert Testimony,” and covers the timing 
and content of disclosure of experts’ opinions.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2).  That section 
differentiates between the disclosure requirements for experts retained specifically for 
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the context of Rule 26 is no coincidence; the various parts of Rule 26 are 
designed to work in tandem. 
Most notably, the shifting of discovery expert fees to the opposing 
party11 is justified by the robust automatic disclosure rule that applies to most 
experts.12  The broad expert disclosure rule requires that most experts 
provide a complete and accurate disclosure of their opinions, the basis for 
those opinions, and all information reviewed in forming that opinion.13  The 
disclosure rule also requires most experts to disclose information about, 
among other things, their background, experience, expertise, and rates.14  
Because of the broad disclosure requirements, Rule 26 anticipates that it will 
be unnecessary for the expert to be deposed or, even if deposed, for the 
deposition to be significantly shorter than it would be without the 
disclosures.15  In addition, the right to depose an opposing expert16 is 
balanced by the obligation to pay the expert for her deposition time.17  By 
making the opposing party pay for the deposition, the rule assures that the 
party that retained the expert will not have to pay the expert for work that the 
party did not request nor benefit from, such as the expert’s deposition.  Yet, 
at the same time, the rule permits the free and liberal discovery of 
information, which is a cornerstone of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.18 
 
purposes of litigation and other experts, and only requires the former to provide reports.  Part 
(b) addresses, among other matters, “Trial Preparation: Experts.”  Namely, Rule 26(b)(4) 
provides that: 
 “A party may depose any person who has been identified as an expert whose opinions 
may be presented at trial.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(A); 
 “[D]rafts of any report or disclosure required under Rule 26(a)(2), regardless of the form 
in which the draft is recorded[,]” is protected work product, as are many 
“communications between the party’s attorney and any witness required to provide a 
report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B), regardless of the form of the communications . . . .”  FED. 
R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(B)–(C); 
 A “party may not, by interrogatories or deposition, discover facts known or opinions held 
by an expert who has been retained or specially employed by another party in 
anticipation of litigation or to prepare for trial and who is not expected to be called as a 
witness at trial” absent certain exceptions.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(D);  
 “Unless manifest injustice would result, the court must require that the party seeking 
discovery . . . pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to 
discovery . . . .”  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(E). 
 11  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(E). 
 12  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2).  
 13  See id.  
 14  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B). 
 15  See 8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2034 
(3d ed. 1998), Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2018). 
 16  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(A). 
 17  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(E). 
 18  See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (“We agree, of course, that the 
deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment.  No longer can 
the time-honored cry of ‘fishing expedition’ serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the 
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B. The Rationale for the Expert Fee Shifting Rule 
The “basic proposition” of the expert fee shifting rule “is relatively 
straightforward—a party that takes advantage of the opportunity afforded by 
Rule 26(b)(4)(A) to prepare a more forceful cross-examination should pay 
the expert’s charges for submitting to this examination.”19  In other words, 
while a party is permitted to depose the opposing party’s expert, the deposing 
party should be the one who pays the expert’s deposition fees. 
While this basic rationale behind expert fee shifting may appear logical, 
fee shifting—even when seemingly warranted—is an anomaly within the 
American legal system.20  Fees are rarely shifted, let alone shifted 
automatically.21  On the rare occasion in which attorneys’ fees are shifted, 
the shifting is not automatic, but rather happens only after a detailed fee 
application is made.  The opposing party has the opportunity to challenge the 
application and the court ultimately arrives at a reasonable amount.22  Thus, 
the question arises: what warrants the unique and automatic rule for shifting 
experts’ fees?  The answer comes down to experts’ voluntary involvement 
in the legal system and the fact that someone has to pay them; the tradeoff 
between mandatory disclosures and the perceived need for depositions; and 
the fact that the deposing party controls the deposition by determining the 
location, length, etc., and thus the related costs. 
First, expert witnesses are themselves anomalies.  Most witnesses in 
litigation have not willingly injected themselves into the legal process; they 
are there, generally, because they have first-hand knowledge of some fact at 
issue in a trial.  If necessary, they can be subpoenaed and forced to provide 
testimony.  They are paid a nominal per diem amount for their testimony, 
 
facts underlying his opponent’s case.”); Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The 
Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 739 (1998) 
(discussing liberalization of discovery rules). 
 19  WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 2034; see also Eastman v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 14-
cv-00703-WQH (WVG), 2016 WL 795881, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2016). 
 20  See, e.g., Globe Distributors, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co. (In re Globe Distributors, Inc.), 
145 B.R. 728, 733 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1992) (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness 
Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 245 (1975)) (noting that a fee shifting statute was “contrary to the general 
‘American rule’ that each party to a lawsuit bears its own costs (and fees)”).  
 21  See id. at 733 (“Where, as here, an exception to the general rule is allowed, such [fee 
shifting] should be implemented in a conservative fashion.”). 
 22  See DiNicola v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Local 503, No. 6:08-cv-6317-TC, 2013 WL 
5781220, at *1–2 (D. Or. Oct. 25, 2013), for an example of the rigorous and detailed 
procedures involved in shifting attorney’s fees under a federal statute.  See also Matthew D. 
Klaiber, Comment, A Uniform Fee-Setting System for Calculating Court-Awarded Attorneys’ 
Fees: Combining Ex Ante Rates with a Multifactor Lodestar Method and a Performance-
Based Mathematical Model, 66 MD. L. REV. 228, 235 (2006) (noting development of “certain 
fee-calculation methodologies aimed at guiding the process of awarding attorneys’ fees[,]” 
including “the percentage-of-recovery method, the lodestar method, and the pure factor-based 
method”). 
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regardless of the hardship or costs imposed on them or their work as a result 
of providing such testimony.23  Expert witnesses, though, are retained by one 
of the parties.  The expert witness serves by choice and, like most people, 
chooses not to work for free. 
As it turns out, the fact that experts are hired—and not required—to be 
part of the litigation process makes all the difference as to why discovery 
fees for experts are shifted.  Rather than expert discovery being viewed as a 
right, like other forms of discovery, it is viewed more as a privilege with 
strings attached.24  The party that hires the expert must pay the expert for 
time spent forming expert opinions in the case, which includes reviewing 
documents, talking to persons with first-hand knowledge, reviewing relevant 
literature in the expert’s field, formulating opinions, and drafting a report.  
That can be costly, and it is a cost that is paid for solely by the party that 
retains the expert.25  Expert discovery of those opinions is thus viewed as 
potentially “unfair” because it “let[s] one party have for free what the other 
party has paid for.”26  Therefore, historically, courts have restricted discovery 
of an adversary’s expert, particularly as to the expert’s opinions, based on 
“the fear that one side will benefit unduly from the other’s better 
preparation.”27  Rule 26(b)(4)(E) shifting of expert discovery fees represents 
an attempt to find a middle ground that avoids this potential unfairness by 
allocating “expert expenses between the retaining party and the one seeking 
discovery.”28  The result is that discovery of experts’ testimony is allowed, 
but the deposing party must pay for it. 
Second, unlike lay witnesses, experts have to disclose their opinions.  
In theory, such disclosures obviate, or at least drastically reduce, the need for 
any, let alone lengthy, deposition testimony. This is because all of the 
experts’ opinions, and the bases for such opinions, have already been 
disclosed.29  Indeed, when Rule 26 was amended to require disclosure of 
 
 23  See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1821(b) (West 2018) (“A witness shall be paid an attendance fee of 
$40 per day for each day’s attendance.”).   
 24  See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 2034. 
 25  See Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., No. 4:05-CV-0273-HLM, 2007 WL 9712069, at *6 
(N.D. Ga. July 24, 2007) (quoting Magee v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 172 F.R.D. 627, 645 
(E.D.N.Y. 1997)) (“Rule 26(b)(4)(C)’s mandatory compensation requirement is intended ‘to 
avoid the unfairness of requiring one party to provide expensive discovery for another party’s 
benefit without reimbursement.’”). 
 26  WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 2034.  
 27  FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment.  
 28  WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 2034. 
 29  See Schmidt v. Solis, 272 F.R.D.1, 2 (D.D.C. 2010); Waters v. City of Chicago, 526 
F. Supp. 2d. 899, 900 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (“This Court frequently reminds counsel in cases before 
it that an important consequence of the Rule 26(a)(2)(B) and (C) requirement of a 
comprehensive report from every opinion witness who is expected to testify is that the 
witness’ trial testimony is circumscribed by that report.”); cf. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, 
§ 2034 (“If, as was hoped, these disclosures serve to avoid the need for some experts’ 
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expert reports, one primary reason cited for the amendment was that it would 
and should discourage parties from taking experts’ depositions.  The Rule 26 
Advisory Committee reasoned that the expert’s report would “eliminate the 
need to take a useless deposition in which the expert simply repeats what 
[the expert] had said in his report.”  By extension, the Advisory Committee 
believed that “forc[ing] the party taking the deposition to pay the expert’s 
fee” would hopefully “eliminate[e] such depositions because the expert will 
have produced a report that clearly indicates the opinions the expert holds 
and will testify about at trial.”30  Put differently, the deposing party could 
have chosen a less expensive discovery method, such as written 
interrogatories, but it did not.31  Thus, the need for an expert deposition is 
viewed with some skepticism, such that a party that insists on deposing the 
opposing expert, despite having a “complete and accurate” report, must pay 
for that luxury. 
Finally, the third rationale is that the deposing party controls not only 
whether the expert is deposed, but also the length and location of the 
deposition.  So, not only is the deposing party viewed as the beneficiary of 
the deposition, but it is also viewed as the party that controls the costs 
associated with the deposition.  Put simply, if the deposing party elects to 
take an eight-hour deposition at a location that is remote for the expert, it 
should have to incur all related costs—not the party that retained the expert. 
 
depositions, or at least to shorten the depositions, that may mean that there will be fewer 
occasions for payment of expert fees pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(C).”).  For a thorough history 
of the expert discovery rule from its inception to its most recent amendments in 2010, see 
generally Brett Lawrence, Note, What Do I Have to Do to Get Paid Around Here?: Rule 
26(b)(4)(E)(i) and the Qualms Regarding Expert Deposition Preparation Time, 74 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 2231 (2017). 
 30  FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment. 
[P]aragraph (4)(A) is revised to provide that experts who are expected to 
be witnesses will be subject to deposition prior to trial, conforming the 
norm stated in the rule to the actual practice followed in most courts, in 
which depositions of experts have become standard. Concerns regarding 
the expense of such depositions should be mitigated by the fact that the 
expert’s fees for the deposition will ordinarily be borne by the party 
taking the deposition.  The requirement under subdivision (a)(2)(B) of a 
complete and detailed report of the expected testimony of certain forensic 
experts may, moreover, eliminate the need for some such depositions or 
at least reduce the length of the depositions.  Accordingly, the deposition 
of an expert required by subdivision (a)(2)(B) to provide a written report 
may be taken only after the report has been served. 
Id. 
 31  Lancaster v. Lord, No. 90 Civ. 5843 (RLC), 1993 WL 97258, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 
31, 1993) (“Since the defendants chose to depose [the opposing expert] rather than to seek 
discovery through written interrogatories, Rule 26(b)(4)(C) applies, and plaintiff is entitled to 
reimbursement for [the expert’s] time spent preparing for and attending the deposition[.]” 
(citation omitted)). 
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C. The Mechanics of the Expert Fee Shifting Rule 
The expert fee shifting rule is seemingly straightforward.  It provides, 
in pertinent part, that “[u]nless manifest injustice would result . . . the court 
must require that the party seeking discovery . . . pay [the adverse party’s] 
expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery under [this 
subdivision] . . . .”32  Thus, the rule, at its clearest and most basic level, 
provides that the party who seeks expert discovery must pay for it.  It is well-
settled that deposition time is compensable under Rule 26(b)(4)(E) as “time 
spent in responding to discovery.”33  Accordingly, the rule does not by its 
express terms include trial testimony, responding to a Daubert motion, or 
any non-discovery matter.34  Further, the rule covers discovery relating to all 
types of experts, whether the expert is one that is specifically retained for 
litigation or not.35  Thus, fees are shifted even for experts that are the 
adversary’s employees or for experts that have opinions due to their pre-suit 
involvement in the subject of the litigation, such as in treating physicians.36  
And finally, because the rule “provides an independent basis for recovery of 
expert fees as part of discovery,” it “applies to both parties, not just to the 
prevailing party.”37 
For expert discovery covered by the rule, the fee-shifting provision 
contains two operative parts:  (1) the party seeking discovery must “pay the 
expert a reasonable fee,” and (2) the fee payment is only “for time spent in 
responding to discovery.”  While this language seems straightforward at first 
blush, the devil (and litigation) is in the details.  Various and recurring 
questions arise in the context of fee shifting.  What is “time spent responding 
to discovery?”  The usual way in which experts respond to discovery is by 
providing deposition testimony.  Still, what time relating to depositions is 
covered?  While the actual time spent in being deposed is clearly 
 
 32  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(E).  Prior to the 2010 amendment to Rule 26, the expert fee 
shifting rule was located at 26(b)(4)(C).  Thus, in cases that predate that amendment, a 
reference to Rule 26(b)(4)(C) is a reference to the fee shifting rule now housed at 26(b)(4)(E).  
See Lawrence, supra note 29, at 2253 (“[F]ormer subdivision (b)(4)(C) became (b)(4)(E).”). 
 33  Fisher v. Accor Hotels, Inc., No. Civ.A. 02-CV-8576, 2004 WL 73727, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 
Jan. 12, 2004) (citation omitted). 
 34  See Nester v. Textron, Inc., No. 1:13-CV-920 RP, 2016 WL 6537991, at *3 (W.D. 
Tex. Nov. 3, 2016). 
 35  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(E). 
 36  See Maxwell S. Kennerly, Treating Physicians & Non-Retained Expert Witnesses: 
What Do Parties Have to Disclose Before Trial?, LITIG. & TRIAL (Mar. 7, 2017) 
https://www.litigationandtrial.com/2017/03/articles/attorney/ non-retained-expert-witnesses 
(“‘Non-retained’ expert witnesses are more common in federal court than many people 
realize: think of the doctors who treated an injured plaintiff, the government employees who 
investigated an accident, the engineers who worked on a defective product, or the competing 
inventors of a design in a patent infringement case.”). 
 37  La. Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 332–33 (5th Cir. 1995). 
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compensable, what about the time peripheral to a deposition, such as travel 
time?  What about the time that an expert spends preparing (e.g., reviewing 
the file) for the deposition? 
Similarly, what constitutes a “reasonable fee?”  Is a flat-fee rate of 
$3000 for a deposition that lasts only two hours “reasonable?”  Is an hourly 
rate of $500 for deposition testimony “reasonable?”  What if that same expert 
only charged $200 an hour for other work in the case?  In addition, 
interpretative problems arise not only from what the rule says, but from what 
the rule does not say.  The rule fails to state when fees are due or who bears 
the burden of proving the reasonableness of fees.  Further, the rule does not 
address the procedures when disagreements about fees arise—a gap made all 
the worse by the rule’s blanket pronouncement that fees must be paid unless 
“manifest injustice” would result.  These problems associated with the rule 
are addressed in Part III, and the overall implications associated with those 
problems are discussed in Part IV. 
III.  PROBLEMS WITH THE FEE SHIFTING RULE 
The problems with the expert fee-shifting rule arise from not only what 
it does say, but also from what it does not say.  First and foremost, the rule 
is plagued by interpretive issues regarding its scope that arise from 
ambiguities within its four corners; key operational terms are left vague and 
undefined.  Second, the rule makes no provisions for the logistical issues that 
routinely arise under it.  It leaves litigants and courts alike to make educated 
guesses about, for example, when payments are due.  Finally, even for 
matters in which it is clear, the rule strikes the wrong balance by shifting fees 
without justification.  The result is that the deposing party ends up paying 
experts’ fees that it did not request, does not control, and gains no benefits 
from. 
A. Interpretative Problems:  What Constitutes “Reasonable Fees” 
for “Time Spent Responding to Discovery” 
While the rule’s “basic proposition is relatively straightforward,” the 
implementation is not.38  Instead, “potential difficulties and unfairness lurk 
below the surface.”39  Most notably, the two main prongs of the rule—that 
the deposing party must “pay the expert a reasonable fee” and that fee must 
pay for “time spent in responding to discovery”—raise numerous 
interpretative questions. 
For example, is an expert’s flat fee that charges the opposing party for 
setting aside a full day “reasonable” regardless of the length of the 
 
 38  WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 2034. 
 39  Id. 
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deposition?  Is an expert’s fee “reasonable” if the expert charges a higher 
hourly rate for his deposition than he did for the time spent preparing his 
report?  Is time that an expert spends travelling to and from the deposition 
part of “time spent in responding to discovery,” such that the deposing party 
must pay the expert’s fees for that time?  What about the time an expert 
spends preparing for her deposition—must the opposing party pay for such 
time as part of “time spent responding to discovery?” 
In addition, some interpretative problems arise from what the rule fails 
to address.  Most notably absent from the four corners of the rule is any 
mention of when fees are due and what process should be employed when 
disputes arise over fees.  And despite an endless stream of district court 
litigation, these interpretative problems continue to mire the fee-shifting rule.  
Ambiguities in a rule frequently are resolved at the appellate court level.  
Once the appellate courts conclusively interpret a rule, its meaning becomes 
settled, there is uniformity, and there is no need (or ability) for district courts 
to continue to re-examine the issue.  That has not, however, been the case for 
the expert fee shifting rule.40  Rather, the same questions of law have been 
repeatedly litigated in federal courtrooms across the country.41  What makes 
this rule different, such that the typical process for resolving its meaning has 
not happened despite its promulgation over twenty-five years ago? 
The problem lies in the fact that almost all litigation over the rule occurs 
at the district court level and never reaches the appellate courts.42  It is well-
known that “the [r]ule lacks discussion at the federal appellate level.”43  The 
dearth of appellate discussion stems from two dynamics.  First, most cases 
settle rather than go trial and thus there is no appeal.  Second, even for those 
cases for which there is an appeal, the issue of which fees should have shifted 
would not be an issue raised on appeal because it is not an outcome-
determinative issue.  So while understandable, the lack of authority at the 
appellate level means the rule “cannot be applied consistently in a region, let 
 
 40  Id. (“The courts have deplored the paucity of authority on the subject . . . .”) (footnote 
omitted).  
 41  The absence of appellate authority, and thus consistency, has been noted by district 
courts.  See, e.g., Veasey v. Abbott, No. 2:13-CV-193, 2017 WL 1092307, at *1 (S.D. Tex. 
Mar. 23, 2017) (“The Fifth Circuit has not addressed whether Rule 26(b)(4)(E) covers fees 
for time spent preparing for a deposition.  Other courts are split on whether the rule allows for 
such compensation with a slim majority allowing recovery as long as the fees are reasonable.”  
(citing Borel v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 265 F.R.D. 275, 277 (E.D. La. 2010))). 
 42  Namely, it is highly unusual for a party to raise an issue regarding expert fees on 
appeal.  Such an issue surely would not warrant an interlocutory appeal; not only because it 
is not likely to irreparably alter the status quo if it goes to final judgment, but also because the 
likelihood of success is low given the deferential abuse of discretion standard.  And for those 
few cases that do not settle and go to final judgment, at that point there are more consequential 
issues to appeal.  
 43  Lawrence, supra note 29, at 2277. 
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alone across the United States.”44 
1. Disputes Regarding What Constitutes “Time Spent 
Responding to Discovery” 
The largest interpretative problem from the fee shifting rule arises from 
the phrase “time responding to discovery.”  Courts must decide “what is 
encompassed by the phrase,” ranging from “expert fees for the actual 
deposition only, or fees for deposition preparation and other expenses, 
including travel time and expense.”45  Not surprisingly, there is no consensus 
among courts or litigants as to what this cryptic phrase entails.  Further, the 
Advisory Committee Note “provides only the most limited guidance.”46  It 
“states, without further elaboration, that ‘the expert’s fees for the deposition 
will ordinarily be borne by the party taking the deposition.’”47  So although 
it is clear that an expert’s fees for time spent in a deposition are covered, it 
is unclear and disputed whether other fees related to a deposition, such as 
preparation for the deposition and travel to the deposition, must be paid by 
the deposing party.  Courts are split, such that “[t]here has . . . ‘been 
considerable disagreement among courts regarding what activities qualify as 
“time spent in responding to discovery.”‘“48 
Some courts have observed that “[t]he Advisory Committee Note’s use 
of the phrase ‘for the deposition’ suggests that the shifting of expert fees is 
limited to the fees attributable to the deposition itself.”49  As one court 
correctly conceded, however, “the Advisory Committee Note ‘could be 
construed differently,’ and is not dispositive.”50  And, indeed, many courts 
do construe that phrase differently.  The various interpretations of this phrase 
are discussed below with regard to two primary areas of dispute:  whether 
depositions preparation time is covered, and whether time spent traveling to 
and from a deposition is covered.51 
 
 44  Id. (footnote omitted).  
 45  Durkin v. Paccar, Inc., No. 10-2013 (JHR/AMD), 2012 WL 12887769, at *3 (D.N.J. 
Dec. 28, 2012).  
 46  Eastman v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 14-cv-00703-WQH (WVG), 2016 WL 795881, at *5 
n.1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2016). 
 47  Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment). 
 48  Id. at *4 (quoting Fulks v. Allstate Prop. & Cas., Ins. Co., No. 3:14-cv-29473, 2016 
WL 447628, at *2 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 4, 2016)). 
 49  Rock River Commc’ns, Inc. v. Universal Music Grp., 276 F.R.D. 633, 635 (C.D. Cal. 
2011). 
 50  Allstate Ins. Co., 2016 WL 795881, at *5 n.1 (citation omitted). 
 51  Other areas of dispute arise, but with less frequency and fewer consequences.  For 
example, courts have addressed whether “time spent reviewing a deposition [transcript] falls 
within the scope of Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i).”  Nester v. Textron, Inc., No. 1:13-CV-920 RP, 2016 
WL 6537991, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 2016) (“However, like deposition preparation time, 
the Court finds that although the time an expert spends reviewing his or her deposition is 
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i. Whether Fees for Time Spent Preparing for the 
Deposition Are Shifted 
Whether preparation time is included under the fee shifting rule has 
divided the federal courts.52  The inquiry boils down to how courts interpret 
the phrase “time spent responding to discovery.”  At one extreme, some 
courts hold that preparation time is always covered:  “Fees awarded under 
this rule include time spent in preparing for the deposition, in traveling to the 
deposition, and in the deposition.”53  At the other end of the spectrum, some 
courts hold that absent extenuating circumstances, an expert’s time outside 
of the deposition room is not covered:  “[I]n the absence of extenuating 
circumstances, the deposing party is not required to compensate the expert 
for his or her preparation time.”54  These courts reason, among other things, 
that “the language of the rule is too vague to directly dispose of the issue at 
hand.”55  Other courts have attempted to carve out middle grounds, such as 
including preparation time in general, but not time spent consulting with the 
retaining party’s counsel.56 
Without a clear standard in the rule itself, courts tend to resort to policy 
rationales in support of their interpretations—e.g., “even in exceptional, 
complex, or unusual circumstances expert deposition preparation and expert 
 
compensable, it should be limited to the extent it is unreasonable.” (citation omitted)).  
Interpretation issues arise because, while a deposing party may reasonably expect that an 
expert will read her deposition for “obvious errors or typos,” an expert may bill for time spent 
reviewing her deposition when her review is, in essence, to help prepare for cross-examination 
at trial.  Id.  Thus, review time is another category of fees that warrants clarification.  See id. 
 52  See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co., 2016 WL 795881, at *1. 
 53  Auto. Rentals, Inc. v. Keith Huber, Inc., No. 1:10CV385-LG-RHW, 2012 WL 
12854841, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 10, 2012).  This is, in fact, the most common approach.  See, 
e.g., Nester, 2016 WL 6537991, at *3 (citing Halasa v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 609 F.3d 844 
(7th Cir. 2012)); Ushijima v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. A-12-CV-318-LY, 2015 WL 
11251558, at *6 (W.D. Tex. July 30, 2015) (ordering reimbursement of one hour of 
preparation time for every hour spent in deposition); Se–Kure Controls, Inc. v. Vanguard 
Prods. Grp., Inc., 873 F. Supp. 2d 939, 956 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (“In general, courts in this District 
have concluded that, under Rule 26(b)(4)(E), it is reasonable for a party to recover expert 
witness fees from the opposing party for the time an expert spent both preparing for and 
attending a deposition conducted by the opposing party.”); Tavarez–Guerrero v. Toledo-
Dávila, 271 F.R.D. 426, 428 (D.P.R. 2010) (“Courts have generally found that the party taking 
the deposition is required by Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) to pay for preparation time.”)). 
 54  Allstate Ins. Co., 2016 WL 795881, at *1 (“The second question is whether Allstate, 
as the party seeking discovery, is required to compensate the experts not only for their 
testimony—which Allstate has agreed to do—but also for their time spent preparing for the 
depositions.” (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(E)(i) (“Unless manifest injustice would result, 
the court must require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for 
time spent in responding to discovery under Rule 26(b)(4)(A) or (D).”))). 
 55  Id. at *5 (“[The rule] does not specifically address whether fees can be recovered for 
time spent preparing for a deposition . . . .”). 
 56  See Allstate Ins. Co., 2016 WL 795881, at *4. 
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trial preparation are inextricably intertwined.”57  Some courts hold that an 
expert’s preparation time benefits the deposing party because “preparation is 
often necessary to enable the witness to be fully responsive during the 
deposition, and that preparation ‘facilitates the deposition process by 
avoiding repeated interruptions to enable the witness to refresh his 
recollection by consulting.’”58  Other courts reach the opposite policy 
conclusion and hold that the beneficiary of an expert’s preparation is the 
party that hired him, even noting that the deposing attorney might prefer the 
expert be unprepared: “There are doubtless some attorneys who will send an 
expert into a deposition unprepared, but there are surely very few inquiring 
attorneys who complain.”59  Because the rule does not provide clarity, and 
courts do not agree, widespread variation exists surrounding whether and 
when preparation time is covered.60 
In light of the myriad interpretations, one court attempted to summarize 
the various positions taken by courts, positing four approaches: 
As relevant here, courts within the Ninth Circuit and beyond have 
divided on the question of whether Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) requires 
the inquiring party to reimburse the expert for his or her 
preparation time.  A number of courts have held that reasonable 
preparation time is reimbursable.61  Other courts have reached the 
same conclusion on reimbursement for preparation time but have 
specifically excluded any time that the expert spends in 
consultation with the retaining party’s attorney.62  Other courts 
 
 57  Durkin v. Paccar, Inc., No. 10-2013 (JHR/AMD), 2012 WL 12887769, at *4 (D.N.J. 
Dec. 28, 2012), aff’d sub nom., Durkin v. Wabash Nat’l, No. 10-2013, 2013 WL 5466930 
(D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2013). 
 58  Script Sec. Sols., LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-1030-WCB, 2016 WL 
6649721, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2016) (citations omitted).  
 59  Allstate Ins. Co., 2016 WL 795881, at *5. 
 60  The variation exists not only across the courts of appeals, but also among the district 
courts in a given circuit.  See, e.g., id. at *4 (“There is no Ninth Circuit authority on point and 
no consensus among district courts within this circuit.”). 
 61  Id. (first citing United States ex rel. Liotine v. CDW–Gov’t, Inc., No. 3:05-cv-33-
DRH-DGW, 2012 WL 1252982, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 13, 2012); then citing Borel v. Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc., 265 F.R.D. 275, 277 (E.D. La. 2010); then citing Packer v. SN Servicing Corp., 
243 F.R.D. 39, 42 (D. Conn. 2007); then citing Lent v. Fashion Mall Partners, L.P., 223 F.R.D. 
317, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); then citing Mannarino v. United States, 218 F.R.D. 372, 376 
(E.D.N.Y. 2003); then citing Profile Prods., LLC v. Soil Mgmt. Techs., Inc., 155 F. Supp. 2d. 
880, 886 (N.D. Ill. 2001); and then citing Collins v. Vill. of Woodridge, 197 F.R.D. 354, 355 
(N.D. Ill. 1999)).  
 62  Id. (first citing Ndubizu v. Drexel Univ., No. 07-3068, 2011 WL 6046816, at *3 (E.D. 
Pa. Nov. 16, 2011); then citing All Cities Realty, Inc. v. CF Real Estate Loans, Inc., No. SA 
CV 05-615 AHS (MLGx), 2008 WL 10594412, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2008); then citing 
Waters v. City of Chicago, 526 F. Supp. 2d. 899, 901 (N.D. Ill. 2007); then citing Mock v. 
Johnson, 218 F.R.D. 680, 683 (D. Haw. 2003); then citing Magee v. Paul Revere Life Ins. 
Co., 172 F.R.D. 627, 647 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); and then citing Hose v. Chi. & N.W. Transp. Co., 
154 F.R.D. 222, 228 (S.D. Iowa 1994)); see, e.g., All Cities Realty, Inc., 2008 WL 10594412, 
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(and this appears to be a minority view) have held that preparation 
time is not “time spent in responding to discovery” reimbursable 
under Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i).63  A final line of decisions holds that 
preparation time is only reimbursable in complex cases, or in 
extenuating circumstances.64 
Not only do different courts interpret the rule differently, whether 
preparation time is covered is sufficiently ambiguous that at least one judge 
has reversed his position, initially taking a “middle ground” approach and 
later adopting a per se rule: 
         In the Fago case, I attempted to find a middle ground for the 
fee provision in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C)(i) to deal with the 
ambiguities raised in preparing for deposition, where it may be 
unclear whether an expert is “responding to discovery” or engaging 
in trial preparation, the latter of which should not be charged to the 
deposing party.  [A]fter careful consideration, I have come to the 
conclusion that my prior position was misguided.  Instead, I believe 
that reasonable fees for the time spent by an expert for a deposition 
should always be paid by the party taking the deposition.65   
In addition, some courts ignore this issue entirely and do not address whether 
 
at *6 (“[T]he Court must avoid charging the opponent for the deposing party’s ordinary trial 
preparation . . . [and it] will not reimburse fees for the experts’ time spent in conference with 
counsel prior to the depositions.”). 
 63  Allstate Ins. Co., 2016 WL 795881, at *4 (citing Rock River Commc’ns, Inc. v. 
Universal Music Grp., 276 F.R.D. 633, 637 (C.D. Cal. 2011)). 
 64  Id. (first citing Fiber Optic Designs, Inc. v. New Eng. Pottery, LLC, 262 F.R.D. 586, 
592 (D. Colo. 2009); then citing 3M Co. v. Kanbar, No. C06-01225 JW (HRL), 2007 WL 
2972921, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2007); then citing M. T. McBrian, Inc. v. Liebert Corp., 
173 F.R.D. 491, 493 (N.D. Ill. 1997); then citing S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. 
Sewerage Dist., 154 F.R.D. 212, 214 (E.D. Wis. 1994); and then citing Rhee v. Witco Chem. 
Corp., 126 F.R.D. 45, 47 (N.D. Ill. 1989)). 
         The Court therefore holds that fee-shifting for expert preparation is 
the exception, not the rule, and is only required in extenuating 
circumstances.  The Court must next decide whether such circumstances 
are present in this case.  In so doing, the Court does not write on a blank 
slate, but is guided by other courts that have similarly construed Rule 
26(b)(4)(E)(i).  The Rhee court, for instance, noted that reimbursement of 
expert preparation time may be appropriate “in a complex case where the 
expert’s deposition has been repeatedly postponed over long periods of 
time by the seeking party causing the expert to repeatedly review 
voluminous documents.”  In S.A. Healy, the court similarly recognized an 
“exception to the general rule [against reimbursement] in complex cases 
where there has been a considerable lapse of time between an expert’s 
work on a case and the date of his actual deposition.”  Another court 
allowed reimbursement for expert preparation fees where the case was 
‘extremely complex’ and required the expert to review “voluminous 
documents.” 
Id. at *6. 
 65  Schmidt v. Solis, 272 F.R.D. 1, 1 (D.D.C. 2010). 
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deposition preparation time is included in Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i).66  Instead, 
these courts assume, without providing any “rationalization,” that 
preparation time is covered.67 
Finally, the rule’s ambiguity regarding fee shifting for preparation time 
also results in variation among experts.  Some experts include this time in 
their invoices, while others do not.68  This, too, creates a lack of uniformity, 
insofar as experts, without any guidance from the rule, will err on different 
sides—some will take the lack of clarity as an opportunity to charge 
opposing counsel for such expenses, whereas others will note the express 
lack of coverage as a basis not to include such fees. 
Because neither the plain language of the rule nor its advisory notes 
shed sufficient light on what is meant by “time spent preparing for the 
deposition,” a few courts have resorted to issuing standing orders to clear up 
ambiguities in the rule.69  For example, in a multidistrict litigation case, the 
court issued a two-page order with eleven protocols regarding the rule.70  The 
order contains a paragraph defining what is included as “time spent 
responding to discovery”: 
         Pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(E), the Court shall require the 
party or parties seeking to depose an expert witness to pay the 
expert a reasonable fee for time spent by the expert in connection 
with his/her participation in the deposition.  This shall include 
time spent preparing for the deposition (not including time spent 
conferring with counsel), actual time spent in the deposition, and 
travel time to and from the place where the deposition is 
conducted.71 
While room exists for disagreement regarding the interpretation of the rule 
reflected in the standing order, the existence of a standing order at least 
serves to alleviate the interpretative problems and disputes in that particular 
court. 
 
 66  Lawrence, supra note 29, at 2263. 
 67  Id. 
 68  The author’s spouse has served as an expert in more than 100 cases in state and federal 
courts for approximately twenty years and has never billed the opposing party for time spent 
preparing for a deposition.  When asked about his practice, he explained that an expert already 
has done the work and issued a report, and thus should already have done the “preparation” 
needed for a deposition.  To the extent preparation time is needed, it likely is for the benefit 
of the party that engaged the expert, not the party taking the deposition.  
 69  See, e.g., DEPOSITION PROTOCOL REGARDING TENDER & PAYMENT OF EXPERT 
WITNESSES IN CVLO MDL 875 CASES (2012), https://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/ 
MDL/MDL875/15expert%20deposition%20protocol.pdf [hereinafter MDL PROTOCOL]. 
 70  While the protocol represents a single court’s response to the lack of clarity and 
guidance in the rule, the fact that such a protocol was deemed necessary—and that eleven 
different protocols all tied to Rule 26(b)(4)(E) were included—is telling and instructive.  
 71  MDL PROTOCOL, supra note 69, ¶ 2. 
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In the vast majority of cases, there is no case precedent nor a standing 
order that clarifies what is included in “time spent responding to discovery.”  
As a result, litigants and courts frequently resort to policy considerations in 
their interpretations.72  The considerations range from who controls the 
experts’ particular fees and for whose benefit such fees are truly incurred,73 
to the difficulty of gauging what preparation time is reasonable.74  Thus, 
courts spend considerable time analyzing the pros and cons of including 
preparation time as part of “time spent responding to discovery.”  Not 
surprisingly, courts weigh the competing policies differently, resulting in 
varied interpretations.  The result is not only inconsistency among 
interpretations, but also the litigation costs of having various courts decide 
this issue anew because there is no settled law. 
ii. Whether Fees and Expenses for Traveling to and 
from the Deposition Are Shifted 
Like deposition preparation time, no consistency exists regarding 
whether the deposing party must pay for time and expenses spent traveling 
to and from the deposition.  Just as it is unresolved whether preparation time 
is “time spent responding to discovery,” it also is unsettled whether time and 
expenses spent traveling to and from a deposition fall within that language.  
While many courts hold that time and expenses spent traveling is covered,75 
 
 72  See, e.g., Durkin v. Paccar, Inc., No. 10-2013 (JHR/AMD), 2012 WL 12887769, at *1 
(D.N.J. Dec. 28, 2012), aff’d sub nom., Durkin v. Wabash Nat’l, No. 10-2013, 2013 WL 
5466930 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2013) (“Defendant has not cited any binding authority on the 
matter, but relies upon the policy behind Rule 26(b)(4) and asserts that the majority of the 
courts to have addressed this question permit reimbursement.” (citations omitted)). 
 73  See, e.g., Rock River Commc’ns, Inc. v. Universal Music Grp., 276 F.R.D. 633, 636 
(C.D. Cal. 2011) (“[A]n expert’s deposition preparation may encompass a variety of tasks that 
contribute little or nothing to the efficiency of the deposition, are largely unrelated to the 
deposition, or are undertaken for an entirely partisan purpose . . . .”).  
 74  See generally Eastman v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 14-cv-00703-WQH (WVG), 2016 WL 
795881, at *5–6 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2016) (describing various concerns with holding that fees 
should be shifted for time spent preparing for a deposition).  
 75  See, e.g., Nnodimele v. City of New York, No. 13-CV-3461 (ARR), 2015 WL 
4461008, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 21, 2015) (“Ordinarily, hours that an expert spends on 
preparation and travel in connection with the expert’s deposition are compensable under Rule 
26(b)(4)(E).”); Reit v. Post Props., Inc., No. 09 Civ. 5455(RMB)(KNF), 2010 WL 4537044, 
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2010) (“‘The district courts in the Second Circuit have consistently 
held that time spent by an expert preparing for a deposition is compensable under Rule 
26(b)(4)(C),’ and that ‘time spent traveling to and from the deposition, and the expenses 
incurred during travel, so long as they are reasonable, are compensable under Rule 
26(b)(4)(C).’” (quoting New York v. Solvent Chem. Co., 210 F.R.D. 462, 471–72 (W.D.N.Y. 
2002))); EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 5481 LBS AJP, 1999 WL 32909, at 
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1999) (“The EEOC therefore implicitly concedes that properly 
documented and reasonable travel expenses are reimbursable, and at least on the facts of this 
case, the Court agrees.” (citing Ohuche v. British Airways, No. 97 Civ. 1853 (JSM) RLE, 
1998 WL 240481, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 1998) (granting recovery of expert’s travel 
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others hold that it is not contemplated by the rule.76 
Without clear language in the rule, policy considerations—often 
inconsistent—abound.  These policy considerations are weighed anew, and 
differently, by each trial court.  Some courts that interpret the rule as not 
encompassing travel fees and expenses note the potential for the retaining 
party to impose increased costs on the deposing party by hiring an expert in 
a remote location.77  Although recognizing that a party “should be free to 
select the expert of his choice[,]” the opposing party “should not be forced 
to pay the increased costs associated with [a party’s] decision to engage an 
expert from another part of the country.”78  Other courts appear indifferent 
to the potential for one party to impose excessive costs on the opposing party, 




expenses))); Bonner v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 96CIV.4762(KMW)(HBP), 1997 WL 802894, 
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 1997) (“[T]he weight of authority appears to hold that Rule 
26(b)(4)(C) permits recovery of fees for an expert’s travel time . . . in connection with a 
deposition, along with the expert’s out-of-pocket expenses.”); Harbor Software, Inc. v. 
Applied Sys., Inc., No. 92 Civ. 8097(HB), 1997 WL 187350, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1997) 
(granting recovery of expert’s travel expenses); Magee v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 172 
F.R.D. 627, 646 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (“[T]wo issues remain, namely whether [the expert] is 
entitled to compensation for travel time and for time spent preparing for the deposition. The 
short answers are yes and yes.  Travel time has been held compensable.”); DeFelice v. Am. 
Int’l Life Assurance Co. of N.Y., No. 94Civ.8165(AGS)(RLE), 1995 WL 753892, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 1995) (granting recovery for expert’s travel expenses); In re “Agent 
Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 105 F.R.D. 577, 582 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). 
 76  Bonner, 1997 WL 802894, at *1 (“Although there are conflicting decisions, the weight 
of authority appears to hold that Rule 26(b)(4)(C) permits recovery of fees for an expert’s 
travel time and preparation time in connection with a deposition, along with the expert’s out-
of-pocket expenses.” (first citing Magee, 172 F.R.D. at 646; then citing McHale v. Westcott, 
893 F. Supp. 143, 151 (N.D.N.Y. 1995); then citing David Tunick, Inc. v. Kornfeld, 151 
F.R.D. 534, 536–37 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); then citing “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 105 
F.R.D. at 582; and then citing Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Hartz Mountain Indus., 553 F. Supp. 
45, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)). 
 77  Clearly such gamesmanship would not be the sole reason—or even a reason—that a 
party selects a particular expert.  The retaining party’s lack of regard for the fees and expenses 
associated with the expert’s location does nonetheless impose increased expenses on the 
opposing party, and the opposing party neither controls those increased expenses nor benefits 
from them. 
 78  Durkin v. Paccar, Inc., No. 10-2013 (JHR/AMD), 2012 WL 12887769, at *4 (D.N.J. 
Dec. 28, 2012), aff’d sub nom., Durkin v. Wabash Nat’l, No. 10-2013, 2013 WL 5466930 
(D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2013) (quoting Lent v. Fashion Mall Partners, L.P., 223 F.R.D. 317, 318 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004)).  
 79  See, e.g., Rock River Commc’ns, Inc. v. Universal Music Grp., 276 F.R.D. 633, 637 
(C.D. Cal. 2011) (focusing on the deposing party’s ability to “control the amount of time the 
expert spends traveling by selecting a location for an expert’s deposition that minimizes an 
expert’s travel time, potentially including opting to take the deposition by telephone or video 
conference[,]” without acknowledging the travel expenses that would be imposed on the 
deposing party to take a remote deposition). 
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Closely related to the question of compensation for travel time is the 
interpretive question of whether travel expenses (cost of a hotel, airfare, etc.) 
are included in the fee shifting.  Most courts treat the question as merely an 
extension of the travel time.80  Such courts reason that because “travel time 
[is] time spent ‘responding’ to discovery[,]” so too must the related 
“expenses incurred during travel” be deemed as “time spent responding to 
discovery.”81  Other courts rationalize shifting expert travel expenses on 
grounds that lay witnesses may be compensated for “their travel expenses 
post-trial as part of ‘costs.’”82 
Some courts, however, have focused on the plain words of the rule, 
such as payment for “time spent in responding to discovery[,]” and have 
concluded that expenses are not compensable.  For example, in rejecting the 
claim to shift deposition travel expenses to the opposing party, one court 
held: 
         Like with review time, neither party directly addresses 
whether the costs of travel to and from a deposition, such as the 
 
 80  See, e.g., Durkin, 2012 WL 12887769, at *4 (equating travel time and expenses and 
allowing recovery, despite not permitting recovery for deposition preparation time); Ndubizu 
v. Drexel Univ., No. 07-3068, 2011 WL 6046816, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2011) (“Travel 
expenses are also reimbursable under Rule 26(b)(4)(E).” (citing Feliciano v. Cty. of Suffolk, 
246 F.R.D. 134, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[A] number of courts in the Second Circuit have held 
that [Rule 26(b)(4)(E)] ‘permits recovery of fees for an expert’s travel time along with the 
expert’s out-of-pocket expenses.’”))); Dwyer v. Deutsche Lufthansa, AG, No. CV 04-
3184(TCP)(AKT), 2007 WL 526606, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2007) (“A number of courts 
in the Second Circuit have held that Rule 26(b)(4)(C) ‘permits recovery of fees for an expert’s 
travel time along with the expert’s out-of-pocket expenses.’” (quoting Bonner, 1997 WL 
802894, at *1)). 
 81  Handi-Craft Co. v. Action Trading, S.A., No. 4:02 CV 1731 LMB, 2003 WL 
26098543, at *16 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 25, 2003). 
 82  See, e.g., Hillmann v. City of Chicago, No. 04 C 6671, 2017 WL 3521098, at *10 
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2017) (“The Court finds Plaintiff’s arguments for denying [the expert’s] 
travel expenses unpersuasive.  Section 1920 authorizes awarding costs for ‘[f]ees and 
disbursements for . . . witnesses.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1920(3))).  “‘The witness fee 
specified in § 1920(3) is defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1821,’ which provides that witnesses who 
travel to testify at trial or sit for a deposition must be paid an ‘attendance fee’ of $40 per day 
and must be reimbursed for their travel and related expenses.”  Id. (quoting Crawford Fitting 
Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 440 (1987)); see 28 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1), (b)–(c)(1), 
(c)(3)–(d)(1) (2018).  “Collectively, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821 and 1920(3) authorize the award of 
costs to reimburse witnesses for their reasonable travel and lodging expenses.”  Hillmann, 
2017 WL 3521098, at *10 (quoting Majeske v. City of Chicago, 218 F.3d 816, 825–26 (7th 
Cir. 2000).  “Accordingly, courts in this District have routinely awarded costs for expert 
witnesses’ travel expenses.”  Id.  (citing Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., No. 01 C 3585, 2007 
WL 25771, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2007) (“awarding expenses for expert witness to travel to 
testify at trial even though trial was belatedly rescheduled”)); Vardon Golf Co. v. Karsten 
Mfg. Corp., No. 99 C 2785, 2003 WL 1720066, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2003) (“awarding 
costs for expert witness’s travel expenses”)).  This logic, however, is limited by the fact that 
“costs” are only awarded to the prevailing party, and only after a judgment.  See infra Part 
II.C. 
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cost of a plane ticket or hotel room, fall within the scope of Rule 
26(b)(4)(E)(i).  However, the rule only requires that a deposing 
party pay for an expert’s time, not other costs or expenses.  Thus, 
the Court will exclude such costs from its award of any expert’s 
fees pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i).83 
There is no reason that a rule of procedure, which should facilitate civil 
litigation, instead consumes so much time and so many resources on the part 
of litigants and courts, particularly for a recurring issue like travel time and 
expenses.  First, federal rules exist so that there is uniformity.  That 
uniformity gives parties notice of what is covered by the rule, and avoids the 
costs and uncertainty that arise when no clarity exists, and thus, parties can 
and do reasonably dispute what is covered.  A federal rule that fails to 
provide for such clarity results in excessive time and money spent litigating 
its meaning.  Second, even when a rule is clear—for example, assume that 
the rule unambiguously provided that reasonable travel fees and expenses 
must be paid by the opposing party—one must still question if analyzing a 
hotel’s rate in a given market is a good use of judicial resources.84 
This variation regarding whether fees should shift for an expert’s travel 
time, like similar variation regarding preparation time, results in 
inconsistency among courts.  Depending on where the case is pending, such 
fees may or may not be shifted.  The fact that courts can and do reach 
diametrically opposed positions despite interpreting identical language in the 
rule is troubling in a federal court system premised on uniformity.  It is also 
costly, both in terms of money and time.  There is no reason in a federal 
system to have nearly identical issues being litigated in successive courts 
over and over again. 
2. Disputes Regarding What Constitutes “Reasonable Fees” 
For fees that are deemed included in “time spent responding to 
discovery[,]” the dispute quickly shifts as to what amount of fees are 
“reasonable.”  The rule does not provide any definitions, presumptions, 
factors, or guidelines as to what constitutes “reasonable fees.”  Individual 
courts, rather, are left to develop their own tests, with many lamenting the 
lack of guidance.85  Not surprisingly, wide variation exists across 
 
 83  Nester v. Textron, Inc., No. 1:13-CV-920 RP, 2016 WL 6537991, at *4 (W.D. Tex. 
Nov. 3, 2016) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(E)(i)). 
 84  See EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 5481 LBS AJP, 1999 WL 32909, 
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1999) (“J & H’s reply papers cured the specificity and documentation 
problem of which the EEOC complains.  However, the Court finds the $970 for 2 nights in a 
hotel for Dr. Maister to be excessive—despite the high cost of New York hotel rooms—and 
reduces that amount to $400 (i.e., a $570 reduction).  In all other respects, the Court rejects 
the EEOC’s objections to J & H’s experts’ travel expenses.”). 
 85  See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 2034. 
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jurisdictions, and good faith disputes among attorneys abound as to what 
constitutes “reasonable fees.”86  These disputes tend to fall into three 
categories: (1) the “reasonableness” of the expert’s billed hourly rate and 
expenses; (2) the reasonableness of a “flat fee” rate; and (3) the 
“reasonableness” of the number of hours charged by the expert. 
i. Reasonableness of Experts’ Billed Hourly Rate and 
Expenses 
First, unnecessary disputes arise regarding the “reasonableness” of 
experts’ hourly rates.  Because each expert and their work is different, there 
obviously will be variation in what constitutes a “reasonable fee.”  But the 
rule provides no guidance to courts about what to consider when determining 
what is reasonable, whether through definitions, presumptions, or factors.  
Thus, rather than a uniform test that all courts must apply to determine what 
constitutes a “reasonable fee,” courts instead are left to carve out their own 
tests, a reality that several courts have lamented.87  Over time, many courts 
have adopted the Borel test, which provides: 
To determine whether a fee request pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(E) 
is reasonable, courts consider seven criteria: (1) the witness’s area 
of expertise; (2) the education and training required to provide the 
expert insight that is sought; (3) the prevailing rates of other 
comparably respected available experts; (4) the nature, quality, 
and complexity of the discovery responses provided; (5) the fee 
actually charged to the party who retained the expert; (6) fees 
traditionally charged by the expert on related matters; and (7) any 
other factor likely to assist the court in balancing the interest 
implicated by Rule 26.88 
While the Borel test is more helpful than not, it is highly discretionary by 
nature.  While some discretion is necessarily part of a “reasonableness” 
determination, unnecessary discretion leads to unnecessary disputes.89 
 
 86  What constitutes “reasonable fees” will never be subject to black and white rules and 
necessarily will involve some discretion.  That does not, however, mean that the rule cannot 
provide clarity about what factors and/or presumptions the court must apply in making the 
determination of whether a certain fee application is “reasonable.”  
 87  See, e.g., Hose v. Chi. & N.W. Transp. Co., 154 F.R.D. 222, 224 (S.D. Iowa 1994) 
(“There is very little authority as to what is meant by the term ‘a reasonable fee’ in Rule 
26(b)(4)(C).” (alteration in original omitted) (quoting Goldwater v. Postmaster Gen. of the 
U.S., 136 F.R.D. 337, 339 (D. Conn. 1991))). 
 88  Ovella v. B&C Constr. & Equip., LLC, No. 1:10CV285-LG-RHW, 2012 WL 
12883213, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 18, 2012) (citing Borel v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 265 F.R.D. 
275, 276 (E.D. La. 2010)). 
 89  Indeed, “the time-consuming and expensive judicial process of litigating the fee 
question itself” is one of the primary rationales for “the American Rule against fee shifting.”  
Risa L. Lieberwitz, Attorneys’ Fees, the NLRB, and the Equal Access to Justice Act: From 
Bad to Worse, 2 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1, 4, 10 (1984).  
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In particular, for recurring areas of disputes—i.e., ones that 
predominately involve a legal, rather than a fact-based, question—litigants 
and courts alike would benefit from a clearer test.  One such question of law 
that arises is whether it is reasonable for an expert to charge a different—and 
higher—hourly rate for time spent in a deposition versus time spent 
preparing the expert’s report.90  Without any guidance from the rule (or the 
Borel test, if that test has been adopted by the court), parties are left to argue 
in good faith how the court should interpret what constitutes a “reasonable 
fee.”91 
Another area in which recurring disputes occur regarding the same 
question of law is whether an expert’s hourly rate for travel time can be the 
same as the expert’s rate for performing work.  Because the rule is silent, 
courts vary greatly in their interpretations of the rule, with some treating this 
as a case-by-case inquiry and others establishing a bright-line rule.  The most 
common of these rules is that an expert’s “reasonable” hourly rate is half of 
the expert’s regular rate.92  Still, other courts hold that the travel rate and 
 
 90  For example, in Walker v. Spike’s Tactical, LLC, the expert sought to charge 
defendant’s counsel $2,500 per hour for an in-person deposition as compared to the $600 per 
hour he had charged the plaintiff’s counsel to review records and issue his report.  No. 2:13-
cv-01923-RFB-PAL, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1125, at *4 (D. Nev. Jan. 2, 2015); see also 
EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 5481 LBS AJP, 1999 WL 32909, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1999) (“Indeed, courts most often reduce expert fee requests when the 
expert seeks to charge the opposing party a higher rate than the expert charges the retaining 
party. (first citing Sublette v. Glidden Co., No. Civ.A. 97-CV-5047, 1998 WL 398156, at *4 
(E.D. Pa. June 25, 1998) (“reducing expert fee from $600 per hour to the $200 the expert 
charged the retaining party”); then citing Ohuche v. British Airways, No. 97CIV. 
1853(JSM)RLE, 1998 WL 240481, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 1998) (“reducing expert fee 
where expert charged retaining party less than opposing counsel”); then citing Magee v. Paul 
Revere Life Ins. Co., 172 F.R.D. 627, 646 (“reducing expert’s fee from $350 per hour to the 
$250 the expert charged retaining party”); then citing Jochims v. Isuzu Motors, Ltd., 141 
F.R.D. 493, 496–97 (S.D. Iowa 1992) (“expert’s fee reduced from $500 to $250, because, 
inter alia, ‘[i]t is double the highest hourly rate he is charging the Plaintiff’ who retained 
him”); then citing Draper v. Red Devil, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 46, 48 (E.D. Ark. 1987) (“In the 
absence of proof as to the reason(s) why the expert charged counsel for the Plaintiff $110.00 
and counsel for the defense $120.00 hourly, the fee will be determined at the rate of $110.00 
per hour.”); then citing Anthony v. Abbott Labs., 106 F.R.D. 461, 464–65 (D.R.I. 1985) 
(“expert fee reduced from $420 hourly to $250 hourly, the charge the expert ‘was content to 
charge a (friendly) litigant . . . for his time’”); and then citing Mathis v. NYNEX, 165 F.R.D. 
23, 26 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (“The court is especially persuaded [that the expert’s fee is 
reasonable] by the fact that [the expert] regularly charges the same rate for his consultative 
services and is charging plaintiff that rate for his expert services in this case.”))). 
 91  In a case in which the parties disputed that very issue, the court began its analysis by 
remarking on the lack of authority: “Both sides cite Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) to support their 
respective positions.  Both sides acknowledge that there are very few cases deciding the issue 
before the court.”  Walker, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1125, at *4. 
 92  See, e.g., Ndubizu v. Drexel Univ., No. 07-3068, 2011 WL 6046816, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 
Nov. 16, 2011) (“For example, the Eastern District of New York created a rule that 
compensation for travel time should be half the normal rate.” (citing Mannarino v. United 
States, 218 F.R.D. 372, 377 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (“The general rule, which this court follows, is 
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work rate can be the same.93  Like many issues that arise under the fee-
shifting rule, there is a lack of uniformity among the courts. 
Likewise, as to what travel expenses are reasonable, courts that shift 
such expenses end up engaging in a highly-factual analysis of the expenses 
billed.94  Courts have, for example, declined to shift expenses for “first class 
travel or first class accommodations.”95  It is not uncommon for courts to 
play the role of a human resources officer, analyzing and policing what daily 
hotel rate is reasonable, for example: “the Court finds the $970 for 2 nights 
in a hotel for Dr. Maister to be excessive—despite the high cost of New York 
hotel rooms—and reduces that amount to $400 (i.e., a $570 reduction).”96 
Finally, in determining reasonableness, some courts look behind the 
scenes to which party caused the travel time and expenses.97  For example, 
if the retaining party could have but did not hire an expert closer, the court 
 
that compensation for travel time should be half the regular hourly amount charged.”))); Reit 
v. Post Props., Inc., No. 09 Civ. 5455(RMB)(KNF), 2010 WL 4537044, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 
4, 2010) (quoting Mannarino, 218 F.R.D. at 377); Dwyer v. Deutsche Lufthansa, AG, No. 
CV 04-3184(TCP)(AKT), 2007 WL 526606, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2007) (“[The expert’s] 
compensation should not be at the full hourly rate charged for rendering professional services.  
Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that Defendants shall pay Plaintiff’s expert for his travel 
time at half of his normal rate, or $ 175, and reasonable travel expenses.” (citation omitted)). 
 93  See, e.g., Handi-Craft Co. v. Action Trading, S.A., No. 4:02 CV 1731 LMB, 2003 WL 
26098543, at *17 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 25, 2003). 
The hourly fee charged by an expert for deposition time has also been 
held reasonable for a measure of compensation for travel time.  Mr. 
Martin claims the same rate for travel time as that claimed for deposition 
time.  Therefore, the court will order plaintiff to pay Mr. Martin his 
deposition rate for the time spent traveling from his home in the United 
Kingdom to St. Louis for his deposition. 
Id. (first citing Magee, 172 F.R.D. at 647; and then citing David Tunick, Inc. v. Kornfeld, 151 
F.R.D. 534, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)). 
 94  There is no uniformity about what travel expenses are reasonable for experts, even in 
arms-length transactions.  See Todd Hatcher, How to Manage an Expert Witness’ Travel Fees, 
EXPERT INST. (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.theexpertinstitute.com/how-to-manage-an-expert-
witness-travel-fees/. 
While experts usually charge set hourly fees for relevant tasks such as 
court testimony, depositions and file reviews, the proper compensation 
for an expert’s travel expenses can be a more uncertain, nebulous area.  It 
doesn’t help that there are no set standards which dictate how to handle 
experts’ travel costs. 
Id. 
 95  Frederick v. Columbia Univ., 212 F.R.D. 176, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also 28 
U.S.C. § 1821(c)(1) (2012) (“Such a witness shall utilize a common carrier at the most 
economical rate reasonably available.”). 
 96  EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 5481 LBS AJP, 1999 WL 32909, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1999). 
 97  See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 2034 (“Perhaps no overarching rule is appropriate, 
but judicial sensitivity to the underlying considerations surely is.”). 
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might hold that it is unreasonable to reimburse the expert for such expenses.98  
On the other hand, if the deposing party insisted on the expert traveling to 
the jurisdiction to be deposed, rather than going to the expert or conducting 
a phone deposition, the court might use that to justify the “reasonableness” 
of shifting the travel fees and expenses.99  Inquiries into which party 
“caused” travel time to be incurred are not, however, universal.  Many courts 
do not consider this factor as part of the “reasonable fees” prong.  Thus, this 
variation in the interpretation of what constitutes “reasonable” ends up being 
litigated.  Without clear language in the rule or a uniform interpretation, 
litigants understandably disagree about what the deposing party is required 
to pay.  Whether the disputes end up in court or not, they are expensive and 
time-consuming, and could be circumvented by adding presumptions to the 
rule. 
A final issue that arises under the “reasonableness” prong, and that 
reveals a limitation of the Borel test, concerns the fifth factor: “(5) the fee 
actually charged to the party who retained the expert.”  Experts sometimes 
will charge a flat fee to the party that retained them, and then charge an 
hourly rate to the deposing party.100  While Borel directs a court to compare 
 
 98  See Don Zupanec, Reimbursing Expert’s Travel Expenses, 19 FED. LITIGATOR 16 
(2004). 
[D]istrict court said the plaintiff was free to select an expert of his choice, 
regardless of where the person was located. But the defendants would not 
be compelled to pay the additional costs resulting from the decision to 
retain someone from Georgia. This was especially true since the plaintiff 
made no showing, or even claimed, that no acceptable security experts 
were available in the New York area. . . .  A party retaining a “distant” 
expert who doesn’t show that no similarly qualified “local” expert is 
available should not be surprised if the court is reluctant to require the 
deposing party to pay the expert’s entire travel expenses to and from a 
deposition. 
Id. (citing Lent v. Fashion Mall Partners, L.P., 223 F.R.D. 317, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)). 
 99  See, e.g., Hillmann v. City of Chicago, No. 04 C 6671, 2017 WL 3521098, at *10 
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2017). 
Although Plaintiff did at one point raise the prospect of a telephonic 
deposition of White, in the same correspondence Plaintiff requested dates 
of availability for his deposition “here in Chicago.”  And Plaintiff 
ultimately confirmed that the deposition would take place in Chicago.  
Given the parties’ agreement that White’s deposition would take place in 
Chicago, Plaintiff’s retrospective objection that the deposition could have 
been telephonic is not a basis to deny costs. 
Id. (citing BASF Corp. v. Old World Trading Co., No. 86 C 5602, 1992 WL 229473, at *3 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 1992) (“A joint decision on where to hold a deposition does not constitute 
any logical basis for refusing to grant witness travel costs which are actually incurred.”)); 
Handi-Craft Co. v. Action Trading, S.A., No. 4:02 CV 1731 LMB, 2003 WL 26098543, at 
*16 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 25, 2003) (“The court first notes that it is plaintiff who is demanding that 
Mr. Martin’s deposition continue in St. Louis, and not via telephone.  Thus, it is clear that 
plaintiff should be responsible for Mr. Martin’s travel costs to St. Louis.”). 
 100  See, e.g., Walker v. Spike’s Tactical, LLC, No. 2:13-cv-01923-RFB-PAL, 2015 U.S. 
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those rates, an apples-to-apples comparison is not possible.  Many courts 
then simply disregard this factor, notwithstanding the fact that it is arguably 
the most important way to gauge reasonableness—what the market has 
freely paid for the expert.101 
The great variation in how courts interpret what constitutes “reasonable 
fees” has real consequences for litigants and experts.  First, it means that the 
rate that is deemed “reasonable” for identical work may vary simply because 
of the location of the court in which the case is pending.  An expert testifying 
in two different federal courts may be reimbursed in one court for time spent 
traveling at the expert’s full rate, but may be reimbursed at half of that rate 
in the other court.  Likewise, one court may conclude that it is per se 
unreasonable to charge different rates for deposition time and writing the 
report, while another may conclude that it is presumptively reasonable to do 
so.  That lack of uniformity is the opposite of what is expected from a federal 
rule of procedure.102  It also is unfair, insofar as the relative dollar amounts 
at stake are high.103 
 
Dist. LEXIS 1125, at *4 (D. Nev. Jan. 2, 2015) (highlighting that expert billed deposing 
attorney $2,500 per hour for an in-person deposition as compared to the $600 per hour he had 
charged the plaintiff’s counsel to review records and issue his report).  
 101  For example, in Mathis v. NYNEX, the court was “especially persuaded [that the 
expert’s fee was reasonable] by the fact that [the expert] regularly charge[d] the same rate for 
his consultative services and [wa]s charging plaintiff that rate for his expert services in this 
case.”  165 F.R.D. 23, 26 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).  Even so, in cases in which courts are critical of 
the fact that an expert cannot arrive at an hourly rate for the work he or she did for the retaining 
party, courts nevertheless throw out that factor rather than taking its absence as a strike against 
the reasonableness of the fees requested.  See, e.g., Garnier v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., No. 
04CV1825(NGG)(KAM), 2006 WL 1085080, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2006). 
          With respect to the fee actually being charged to the retaining party, 
defendants’ counsel, in response to this Court’s order, has represented 
that Dr. Glass cannot in good faith estimate the time he expended 
examining plaintiff and preparing a report of that examination.  The Court 
is troubled by this position, given that Dr. Glass has testified as an expert 
in over 500 cases, and claims to have examined “thousands of plaintiffs 
and defendants in civil law suits.”  Dr. Glass should be able to estimate 
the amount of time he expended in this case, but has not done so.  In any 
event, this factor is not dispositive; instead, the Court must balance the 
defendants’ need for competent experts with the need to protect the 
opposing party with being “unfairly burdened by excessive ransoms 
which produce windfalls for the defendants’ expert.” 
Id. (alterations in original omitted) (quoting Magee v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 172 F.R.D. 
627, 645 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)). 
 102  See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Establish Uniformity, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
https://www.fjc.gov/history/timeline/federal-rules-civil-procedure-establish-uniformity (last 
visited Aug. 10, 2018) (“The rules, which went into effect on September 16, 1938, after 
gaining congressional approval, ensured that the procedure followed in federal courts 
throughout the nation would be consistent and uniform.”). 
 103  See, e.g., Neutral Tandem, Inc. v. Peerless Network, Inc., No. 08 C 3402, 2011 WL 
13199213, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2011) (demonstrating a case where one side sought 
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In addition, the lack of guidance concerning what standard courts 
should apply as to what is “reasonable” means that litigants and experts alike 
lack notice of what a given court will deem reasonable.  If everything is 
discretionary, then litigants can be expected as advocates to engage in 
disputes about what is reasonable.  Such disputes, even if they never go 
before a court, waste time and resources when the rule could provide 
guidance that would limit the range of what is reasonable.  Litigants may pay 
“unreasonable” rates because the expense of litigating the issue in court 
outweighs any upside from litigating. 
ii. Reasonableness of Flat Fees 
In addition to disputes about the “reasonableness” of the expert’s billed 
hourly rate and expenses, other “reasonableness” disputes arise when experts 
charge a “flat fee” for their deposition, rather than billing by the hour.  The 
rule does not address the practice of flat fee billing.  Experts who charge a 
flat fee justify it on the ground that they are “forced” to set aside a full day 
for the deposition, regardless of whether it finishes early.  Although many 
courts have opined that “flat fees are generally disfavored,”104 the practice 
continues. 
Indeed the case law is replete with instances in which the parties dispute 
whether flat fees are reasonable.  Notably, these are not cases in which the 
amount of the flat fee—for example, $750 per day versus $3000 per day—is 
disputed.  Rather, these cases address the basic interpretative question of 
whether flat fees are “reasonable” and thus permitted.  Further, these disputes 
involve significant sums.105  It is not uncommon for experts to charge more 
than $2500 for a deposition, regardless of its length. 
Courts that address this issue note that “[f]lat fees for experts are 
generally considered to be unreasonable.”106  Courts rightfully “expect some 
 
$38,759.13 in fees under Rule 26(b)(4)(E) and the other side sought $72,426.74). 
 104  Garnier, 2006 WL 1085080, at *2 (first citing Carafino v. Forester, No. 03 Civ. 
6258PKLDF, 2005 WL 1020892, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2005); and then citing Ramirez v. 
Marriott Corp., No. 98 Civ. 7007, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23390 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2005)). 
 105  See Ndubizu v. Drexel Univ., No. 07-3068, 2011 WL 6046816, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 
16, 2011) (expert charged “a flat fee of $2,500 for his deposition testimony”); Garnier, 2006 
WL 1085080, at *1 (detailing a dispute regarding “a flat rate of $4,000 for a full day 
deposition, $2,500 for four hours, . . . $1,500 for two hours[,]” or “a flat fee of $4,500 . . . 
should it take place at” a more distant location, or “a rate of $450 per hour for the deposition, 
applying the same rate for time spent preparing for and traveling to the deposition”); EEOC 
v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 5481 LBS AJP, 1999 WL 32909, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 21, 1999) (flat fee of $12,000 per day billed). 
 106  Nnodimele v. City of New York, No. 13-CV-3461 (ARR), 2015 WL 4461008, at *2 
(E.D.N.Y. July 21, 2015); see also Kreyn v. Gateway Target, No. CV-05-3175 (ERK)(VVP), 
2008 WL 2946061, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 31, 2008) (“A flat fee for an expert’s appearance . . . 
is generally unreasonable.”); Garnier, 2006 WL 1085080, at *2 (noting that “flat fees are 
generally disfavored” and denying the expert’s request for a flat fee). 
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reasonable relationship between the services rendered and the remuneration 
to which an expert is entitled.”107  “By its nature, a flat fee runs counter to 
this principle because it is simply not reasonable to require parties in every 
case to pay the same amount regardless of the actual ‘services rendered’ or 
‘time spent complying with the requested discovery.’”108  Even when the flat 
fee charge would, as a practical matter, yield a “reasonable” hourly rate, 
courts typically still hold the flat fee unreasonable: “[T]he fact that the 
agreed-upon hourly rate multiplied by the number of hours actually incurred 
in this particular instance happens to approximate the requested flat-rate fee 
does not render the use of a flat flee more reasonable.109 
Still, without a settled rule, experts continue to frequently bill for 
depositions at a flat-fee rate, leading to costly disputes in which courts 
address the relative merits of flat-fee billing.  An expert typically will 
contend that it is “reasonable . . . to charge a flat fee for deposition testimony 
because [the expert] is unavailable to do other work on the day of the 
deposition.”110  Because depositions have a start time but no end time, 
experts often end up setting aside more time than ultimately needed.  On the 
other hand, the fact that depositions last for varying lengths of time is, 
according to some courts, a reason not to charge a flat fee.111 
iii. Reasonableness of Number of Hours Billed 
Finally, disputes regarding the “reasonableness” of experts’ fees arise 
in the context of the number of hours billed by the expert.  This issue arises 
for time billed for preparation time, travel time, or other time that, unlike the 
time spent in the deposition, is not objectively computable.  Thus, in those 
cases where a court holds that fees for preparation and travel time are 
recoverable under the rule, the debate then shifts to how many hours are 
reasonable.112  While what constitutes a “reasonable” number of hours 
billed—like an expert’s hourly rate—will vary in cases, courts can and do 
 
 107  Nnodimele, 2015 WL 4461008, at *2 (citing Mannarino v. United States, 218 F.R.D. 
372, 375 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)). 
 108  Id. (alterations in original omitted). 
 109  Id. (“That the bottom line of the [expert’s] bill approximates the amount sought here 
is purely coincidental, and does not make [the expert’s] flat fee any more reasonable.” (citing 
Mannarino, 218 F.R.D. at 375)); cf. Marin v. United States, No. 06 Civ. 552(SHS), 2008 WL 
5351935, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2008) (“In general, it is not reasonable to request a flat fee 
for deposition testimony regardless of the number of hours actually spent.”). 
 110  Id. at *3. 
 111  See id. (“In any event, plaintiff conveniently ignores that [the expert] charges this flat 
fee regardless of the length of the deposition, which necessarily would have an effect on 
whether he was available to do other work on the day of a deposition.”). 
 112  See Auto. Rentals, Inc. v. Keith Huber, Inc., No. 1:10CV385-LG-RHW, 2012 WL 
12854841, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 10, 2012) (“Rather, [the defendant] disputes the number of 
hours claimed for preparation and review of documents in anticipation of the deposition.”). 
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employ presumptions and rules of thumb about ratios and other formulas that 
provide clarity and uniformity, at least within the employing court.  The rule 
itself contains no guidance. 
While no uniform approach exists, many federals courts across the 
country have adopted a “reasonableness” ratio ranging from 1:1 to 3:1 
between time spent preparing for a deposition and time spent actually being 
deposed.113  Some district courts that handle a high volume of fee disputes, 
such as the Northern District of Illinois, have arrived at a formula that further 
makes the ratio dependent on the complexity of the case, namely: 
To determine whether an expert’s preparation time was 
reasonable, courts in this district have looked “to the preparation 
time in relation to the deposition time, and the nature or 
complexity of the case, to establish a reasonable ratio of 
preparation time to actual deposition time for the case.”  Courts 
have approved of a 1:1 ratio up to a 3:1 ratio depending on the 
nature of the required document review, breadth of the expert’s 
involvement, and difficulty of the issues.  Also relevant is how the 
expert spent his time and the specificity with which the expert 
describes that time in the invoice.114 
Courts’ use of ratios limits the magnitude of hours that can be shifted for 
preparation time, and thus lessens concerns about the deposing party having 
to pay for preparation time over which it has no control.115 
 
 113  See, e.g., Rote v. Zel Custom Mfg. LLC, No. 2:13-cv-1189, 2018 WL 2093619, at *4 
(S.D. Ohio May 7, 2018) (“The Court acknowledges that such preparation-to-deposition 
ratios . . . have generally been found to be reasonable.” (citing Script Sec. Sols., LLC v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-1030-WCB, 2016 WL 6649721, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 
2016) (reviewing a vast sampling of cases addressing ratios and concluding that “many courts 
have limited the recovery to preparation time that does not exceed the amount of deposition 
time, and most have declined to require payment . . . when the ratio of preparation time to 
deposition time exceeds three to one”))); Keith Huber, Inc., 2012 WL 12854841, at *1; 
Neutral Tandem, Inc. v. Peerless Network, Inc., No. 08 C 3402, 2011 WL 13199213, at *5 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2011) (“Therefore, the formula employed by in Nilssen to determine a 
reasonable number of hours for deposition-preparation time is appropriate, which is a ratio of 
three times the length of the deposition.” (citing Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., No. 01 C 
3585, 2007 WL 25771, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2007))). 
 114  LK Nutrition, LLC v. Premier Research Labs, LP, No. 12 CV 7905, 2015 WL 
4466632, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 21, 2015) (citations omitted). 
 115  See Nester v. Textron, Inc., No. 1:13-CV-920 RP, 2016 WL 6537991, at *4 (W.D. 
Tex. Nov. 3, 2016). 
         While Defendant is correct that some courts have chosen not to 
reimburse any preparation time, the concerns of these courts—that the 
deposing party has no control over how much time an expert prepares, 
and that an expert’s preparation may largely consist of trial preparation—
can be addressed by limiting, rather than excluding, reimbursement for 
deposition for preparation time. 
Id. (citing Rock River Commc’ns, Inc. v. Universal Music Grp., 276 F.R.D. 633, 636 (C.D. 
Cal. 2011)). 
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Courts vary in terms of how much detail the expert is required to 
provide about the preparation work she performed, often due to the 
perception that this is an area in which “misuse” could occur.  One court, for 
example, stated: 
         Although this court recognizes that the experts’ preparation 
time falls within the ratios of preparation to deposition time that 
in some cases have warranted reimbursement, it agrees [that the 
retaining party] (or its experts) has not done enough to 
demonstrate how that time was spent to satisfy the court that it 
was reasonably spent in responding to discovery within the 
meaning of Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i).116 
The court noted that “to simply take the adverse party’s unsupported word 
for the amount of preparation time involved is to hand it a tool of oppression 
to misuse.”117  This court’s concern is more than theoretical; in numerous 
cases, experts have billed for double-digit hours of preparation time—for 
example, twenty-three hours of preparation for a thirteen-hour deposition118 
and fourteen hours of preparation for an eight-hour deposition.119 
Other courts, while allowing recovery for some preparation time, 
exclude from fee shifting any hours billed for time spent preparing with the 
retaining counsel.  Other courts scrutinize what level of review is reasonable 
in order to prepare for a deposition and reach differing conclusions.  For 
example, in a case where the court made a modest adjustment to the expert’s 
hours spent for deposition preparation (fourteen hours billed reduced to ten 
hours recoverable), it took the expert’s hours as a presumptive starting point, 
and reduced those hours only where clearly excessive: 
         Nevertheless, while the Court declines to impose a 
categorical limit on the type of record review that warrants 
reimbursement under Rule 26(b)(4)(E), that is not to say that the 
record review in this case was therefore reasonable.  In preparation 
for drafting his expert report, Pollini spent an estimated 12 to 17 
hours reviewing the record.  Two months later, Pollini spent 14 
hours reviewing nearly the exact same materials to prepare for his 
deposition.  While Pollini need not merely review his report and 
 
 116  LK Nutrition, LLC, 2015 WL 4466632, at *3 (“Even courts that have viewed payment 
for deposition preparation as mandatory under Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) have excluded fees where 
the experts do too little to justify the amount of time spent preparing.”). 
 117  Id. at *3 (alterations in original omitted) (citing Profile Prods., LLC v. Soil Mgmt. 
Techs., Inc., 155 F. Supp. 2d. 880, 887 (N.D. Ill. 2001)). 
 118  See EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 5481 LBS AJP, 1999 WL 32909, 
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1999) (“The Court nevertheless is troubled by the preparation time 
billed by J & H expert Dr. Becker, who charged for 23 hours of deposition preparation time. 
No other J & H expert billed for more than 9 hours of preparation time.”). 
 119  See Nnodimele v. City of New York, No. 13-CV-3461 (ARR), 2015 WL 4461008, at 
*5–6 (E.D.N.Y. July 21, 2015). 
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contemporaneous notes as defendants suggest, the latter, 
duplicative record review appears to be excessive, especially in 
light of Pollini’s decades of experience with police practices, his 
prior experience testifying as an expert, and the fact that the issues 
in the case are not especially technical or complex.120 
In contrast, other courts have emphasized that, with respect to deposition 
preparation time, Rule 26(b)(4)(E) should be applied with caution “since that 
time usually includes much of what ultimately is trial preparation work for 
the party retaining the expert.”121 
Regardless of whether a court takes a presumptively reasonable or 
presumptively unreasonable approach, the cases in this area tend, as in the 
above excerpt, to be fairly detailed with respect to the facts of the given cases 
and the policy considerations at issue.  These same policy discussions arise 
in case after case, with each court determining anew its test for 
“reasonableness.”122  Like what is included in “time spent responding to 
discovery,” what fees are “reasonable” need not be so ill-defined.  As 
described below, the rule could and should have presumptions that guide 
reasonableness.123 
B. Logistical Problems: Disputes Arising from the Rule’s Failure to 
Address When and How Fees Shift 
In addition to interpretative problems regarding what fees are 
“reasonable,” logistical problems also arise under the rule.  Even so, nothing 
in the rule addresses these logistical questions.  It leaves litigants and courts 
alike to make educated guesses about, for example, when fee payments are 
due, what consequences arise from an expert’s failure to make mandatory 
disclosures, and what the process is for enforcing the rule when disputes 
arise. 
1. Disputes Regarding Timing of When Fees Must Be Billed 
and Paid 
The rule contains no provision regarding when the experts’ fees should 
be billed and when payment for fees is due.  Without any guidance from the 
rule, the topic of when fees must be billed and, even more so, paid has been 
highly litigated.  Most of the disputes about the timing of fees fall under two 
categories: (1) whether fees must be prepaid if the expert so demands; and 
 
 120  Id. at *5 (citing Mannarino v. United States, 218 F.R.D. 372, 376 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)). 
 121  Constellation Power Source, Inc. v. Select Energy, Inc., No. 3:04cv983 (MRK), 2007 
WL 188135, at *8 (D. Conn. Jan. 23, 2007) (citing WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 2034).  
 122  See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 2034 (“Compensation for time spent preparing 
for the deposition has proved a divisive issue.”). 
 123  See infra Part V.B.2. 
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(2) whether fees must be billed within a certain time frame in order to shift. 
i. Timing for Payment of Fees 
Although the rule is intended to be self-executing and to require 
minimal, if any, involvement by the court, the gap regarding when fees are 
due has spawned extensive and costly motions practice.  Without a clear rule 
as to when fees must be paid, lawyers—being lawyers—may end up 
litigating that issue, often at great expense to their clients, the opposing 
parties, and the court. 
Because the rule does not expressly require that fees be determined and 
paid before the deposition, some lawyers contend that payment before the 
discovery occurs is not required.  This, however, is not a universally accepted 
interpretation of the rule.  In fact, many courts have ordered parties to pay 
the opposing expert’s deposition fees before the deposition occurs.  Other 
courts have held that there is no basis in the rule for fees to be prepaid—and 
have pointed out the logistical challenges of prepayment given the uncertain 
length of most depositions—and thus have denied motions for fees to be 
prepaid.  These courts have made clear that it is the retaining party’s 
“responsibility” to pay the expert, and that “Rule 26 entitles Defendants’ 
counsel [only] to reimbursement for ‘reasonable fees’ in connection with 
[the] deposition.”124 
The problem does not lie primarily in the substantive question of 
whether litigants should have to advance payment or simply provide 
reimbursement; while the reimbursement approach is more sensible for the 
practical reasons identified by courts, an advance payment approach could 
arguably be workable if certain safeguards were put in place.125  Instead, the 
problem lies with the fact that there the rule provides no clear guidance.  That 
lack of guidance means that experts and litigants alike do not know what is 
required or permitted by the rule, so they end up spending time and money 
disputing the issue of when fees are due. 
 
 
 124  AP Links, LLC v. Russ, No. CV 09-5437 (JS) (AKT), 2015 WL 9050298, at *3 
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2015) (emphasis in original) (quoting Conte v. Newsday, Inc., No. CV 
06-4859 (JFB) (ETB), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88546, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2011)).  
 125  For example, in the MDL Protocol, the court issued multiple directives regarding how 
fees must be billed and when fees must be paid.  Among other items, the court ordered that 
expert’s fees would be “due and owing within a period of thirty (30) days from the date of 
receipt by counsel responsible for payment” and provided a “fifteen (15) day grace-period for 
payment after the initial thirty (30) days expires.”  MDL PROTOCOL, supra note 69, ¶ 4.  The 
protocol goes on to note that once a fee is “due and owing, interest shall accrue at a rate of 
3.5% per month for the length of time the invoice remains unpaid” and that a party who has 
failed to pay expert fees due and owing may not “utilize the transcript of that deposition in 
any motion.”  Id. ¶ 6.  The protocol does not address, however, when fees can be billed, and 
leaves open the question of whether an expert can demand advance payment. 
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Take, for example, the all-too-common scenario of an expert, whether 
on his own accord or at the behest of the retaining attorney, who threatens 
not to appear for his deposition unless he is paid for his time in advance.126  
What happens in this situation?  As it turns out, any number of things may 
happen, all of which waste time and resources.  First, the lawyers engage in 
a back-and-forth exchange of emails and likely phone calls about the 
reasonableness or unreasonableness of the request for prepayment, each 
pointing to some supporting but unauthoritative authorities.  This back-and-
forth results in one of three things: (1) the expert may relent and agree to be 
paid after the deposition, typically as long as the deposing lawyer agrees to 
indeed pay the expert; (2) the deposing lawyer may relent and agree to pay 
the expert in advance; or (3) neither side budges, much like the Zaxes in the 
Dr. Seuss classic.127  If neither side budges, no agreement is reached. 
The deposing lawyer may elect to file a motion with the court, asking 
the court to order the expert to appear for the deposition without the advance 
fee payment or with a reasonable fee advanced.  The retaining lawyer may 
elect to file a motion with the court,128 asking the court to order the deposing 
party to advance the expert’s fees.  Or the retaining lawyer instead may send 
a letter informing opposing counsel that the expert will not attend the 
deposition without payment in advance, thus attempting to shift the burden 
to the deposing party.  That lawyer may either:  (1) ignore the letter and move 
forward with the deposition; or (2) bring a motion to compel the expert’s 
 
 126  For example, the expert in Santella apparently threatened that “he might refuse to 
attend his deposition should the matter of his fee not be resolved in his favor.”  Santella v. 
Grizzly Indus., Inc., No. A-11-CA-181 LY, 2012 WL 12882000, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 
14, 2012).  While not directly addressing that threat, the court stated that its “ruling is not 
intended to address the propriety of exclusion of [the expert’s] testimony in that 
circumstance.”  Id.  
 127  After much back-and-forth with the equally stubborn North-Going Zax, the South-
Going Zax threw down the gauntlet and the zero-sum game played out: 
“And I’ll prove to YOU,” yelled the South-Going Zax, 
“That I can stand here in the prairie of Prax  
For fifty-nine years!  For I live by a rule 
That I learned as a boy back in South-Going School. 
Never budge!  That’s my rule.  Never budge in the least! 
Not an inch to the west!  Not an inch to the east! 
I’ll stay here, not budging!  I can and I will 
If it makes you and me and the whole world stand still!” 
DR. SEUSS, The Zax, in THE SNEETCHES AND OTHER STORIES 27, 27 (1961). 
 128  Lawyers have styled such motions in various ways.  See, e.g., Rote v. Zel Custom Mfg. 
LLC, No. 2:13-cv-1189, 2018 WL 2093619, at *1 (S.D. Ohio May 7, 2018) (motion to 
compel); AP Links, LLC, 2015 WL 9050298, at *1 (motion to preclude or, alternatively, to 
order expert to appear for deposition); Handi-Craft Co. v. Action Trading, S.A., No. 4:02 CV 
1731 LMB, 2003 WL 26098543, at *13–14 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 25, 2003) (“Motion for Protective 
Order and Other Relief[] requesting that the court enter a protective order requiring, inter alia, 
that plaintiff adequately compensate two of defendant’s expert witnesses.”). 
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attendance at the deposition.129  Not surprisingly, the deposition often does 
not occur even when the deposing lawyer elects to “move forward” with it.  
Instead, the deposing lawyer appears, makes a record, and then brings a 
motion to compel the expert to appear at the deposition at a later date, as well 
as to recover costs for fees and costs of the aborted deposition. 
Courts, like lawyers, handle this matter in various ways.  Some courts, 
if requested, will order the deposing party to pay some or all of the expert’s 
fees in advance.130  Others will order the expert to appear with the condition 
that the deposing party agrees to pay the fees within a fixed number of days 
post-deposition.131  Other courts will simply compel the expert to appear.132  
In refusing to require advance payment, these courts sometimes note the 
inability of the court or deposing party to foresee how long the deposition 
may take and thus what payment is required.133  Finally, when the expert has 
 
 129  One party, when faced with an opposing expert who refused to appear for his 
deposition because of a dispute about advance payment of his flat fee, brought a motion to 
exclude the expert from testifying at trial or, in the alternative, to appear for a deposition.  AP 
Links, LLC, 2015 WL 9050298, at *1 (noting that “the parties’ dispute arose when they were 
unable to agree whether Plaintiffs’ counsel was required to pay the flat fee sought by [the 
expert] in advance of his deposition”). 
 130  E.g., Garnier v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., No. 04CV1825(NGG)(KAM), 2006 WL 
1085080, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2006) (“[The expert] shall receive a 50% down payment 
on his fee seven days in advance of his deposition, with the balance to be remitted within two 
business days following his deposition.”). 
 131  See, e.g., Dwyer v. Deutsche Lufthansa, AG, No. CV 04-3184(TCP)(AKT), 2007 WL 
526606, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2007).  Some courts take a hybrid approach, such as 
requiring some prepayment of expert fees with the balance due post-deposition.  Not 
surprising, some of these orders are rather intricate for a seemingly straightforward matter. 
         With respect to Dr. Glass’s requirement that he be paid for his 
services in advance of his deposition, the Court orders that Dr. Glass be 
paid a 50% down payment on the estimated fee seven days in advance of 
his deposition, assuming that he will be deposed for seven hours, with the 
balance to be remitted within two business days following his deposition.  
The payment of the balance may be stayed in the event that plaintiff’s 
counsel seeks modification of the hourly rate for the reasons set forth 
[previously].  The Court notes that plaintiff’s counsel has represented that 
his “firm is guaranteeing payment” of Dr. Glass’s fee. 
Garnier, 2006 WL 1085080, at *4. 
 132  See, e.g., Santella v. Grizzly Indus., Inc., No. A-11-CA-181 LY, 2012 WL 12882000, 
at *2–3 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2012) (stating that “neither party nor the Court has discovered 
any legal authority requiring the reasonableness of an expert’s hourly fee be determined prior 
to the taking of the deposition and that the fee be tendered prior to the deposition[,]” and 
ordering appearance without prepayment); Burdette v. Steadfast Commons II, LLC, No. 2:11-
980-RSM, 2012 WL 3762515 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 29, 2012) (ordering appearance without 
prepayment). 
 133  See, e.g., AP Links, LLC, 2015 WL 9050298, at *3 (“[A]n expert ‘may not insist on 
advance payment, and may not set a flat fee before he knows what he will be called upon to 
do; he may instead charge only a reasonable hourly fee.’” (quoting Johnson v. Spirit Airlines, 
Inc., No. CV 07-1874 (FB)(JO), 2008 WL 1995117, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 6, 2008))).  The 
issues are not whether the expert will be paid in advance if she so requires.  It is who will pay 
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failed to appear on the day for which the deposition was noticed, some courts 
will require the retaining party to pay the deposing party for all fees and 
expenses incurred because of the expert’s no-show.134 
Importantly, the Advisory Committee’s notes to the rule state that the 
court may “order payment . . . either as a condition of providing discovery 
or after the discovery has been completed,” thus expressing no presumption 
either way and, instead, leaving the decision to individual courts on a case-
by-case basis.135  Not surprisingly, this perceived discretion invites lawyers 
to take opposing positions.136  The result is time and money spent litigating 
 
the expert in advance: the party that retained her or the opposing party.  See AP Links, 2015 
WL 9050298, at *3 (“The Court will not direct advance payment.” (quoting Almonte v. 
Averna Vision & Robotics Inc., No. 11-CV-1088S(Sr), 2014 WL 287586, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 24, 2014)).  “As the court explained in Conte, Defendants’ counsel retained [the expert] 
and therefore it is ‘his responsibility to pay [the expert].’”  Id. at *1 (quoting Conte v. 
Newsday, Inc., No. CV 06-4859 (JFB) (ETB), 2011 WL 3511071, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 
2011)).  “While Rule 26 entitles Defendants’ counsel to reimbursement for ‘reasonable fees’ 
in connection with [the expert’s] deposition, Plaintiffs’ counsel is under no obligation to pay 
[the expert] a flat fee in advance of his deposition.”  Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Conte, 
2011 WL 3511071, at *3) (citing Johnson, 2008 WL 1995117, at *1). 
 134  See, e.g., Harris v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 226 F.R.D. 675 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (expert 
cancelled deposition because not paid in advance; court said that if no agreement to pay fees 
in advance, no obligation to do so; so result there was that the party who was put out by the 
expert’s last-minute fit was entitled to attorney’s fees and costs incurred in conjunction with 
the cancelled deposition).  
 135  FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment. 
Under subdivision (b)(4)(C), the court is directed or authorized to issue 
protective orders, including an order that the expert be paid a reasonable 
fee for time spent in responding to discovery, and that the party whose 
expert is made subject to discovery be paid a fair portion of the fees and 
expenses that the party incurred in obtaining information from the expert.  
The court may issue the latter order as a condition of discovery, or it may 
delay the order until after discovery is completed. These provisions for 
fees and expenses meet the objection that it is unfair to permit one side to 
obtain without cost the benefit of an expert’s work for which the other 
side has paid, often a substantial sum. 
Id. (first citing Walsh v. Reynolds Metal Co., 15 F.R.D. 376 (D.N.J. 1954); and then citing 
Lewis v. United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21, 23 (W.D. Pa. 1940)); see also 
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 2034.  On the other hand, a party may not obtain discovery 
simply by offering to pay fees and expenses.  Cf. Boynton v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 36 
F. Supp. 593 (D. Mass. 1941).  Notwithstanding the Advisory Committee note, some courts 
have refused to award expert fees in advance on grounds that the rule down not allow it.  See, 
e.g., Conte, 2011 WL 3511071, at *3 (stating that the rule does not entitle the plaintiff “to 
payment in advance” for his expert deposition (first citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(E); and 
then citing Johnson, 2008 WL 1995117, at *1)). 
 136  The fact that courts have such discretion does not, of course, necessarily mean that 
they will use that discretion to order advance payment.  See AP Links, LLC, 2015 WL 
9050298, at *2. 
         Defendants’ counsel asserts that “the Court has discretion to order 
advance compensation of an expert” and cites two cases to support this 
proposition.  However, the Court finds that the circumstances set forth in 
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over the simple matter of when fees must be paid. 
Further, it is not only the litigants that pay the price for the rule’s lack 
of clarity, courts do as well.  When faced with disputes about the timing of 
fees, courts must not only look into the interpretation of a rule that gives little 
guidance, but also into the factual intricacies of the dispute and related policy 
arguments.137  While courts may lament the fact that the parties do not just 
“work it out on their own,” the rule’s lack of guidance, the inconsistency 
among courts’ interpretations, and the “splitting-of-the-baby” that often 
occurs in such disputes provides litigants with more reasons to litigate than 
not. 
ii. Timing of Request for Fees 
Other disputes regarding timing concern when the retaining party must 
request fees from the deposing party.  Because the only hint in how the rule 
should be read comes from an advisory note (and one that many courts do 
not mention), courts differ greatly in their interpretation of the rule’s 
 
these two cases are distinct from the instant matter. Defendants’ counsel 
has not otherwise shown that, under the facts here, the Court should 
exercise its discretion to require Plaintiffs to pay [the expert] in advance 
of his deposition. 
Id. (alterations in original omitted) (first citing Garnier, 2006 WL 1085080, at *2–4 (plaintiff 
disputed the amount of the fee charged by the defendants’ expert, holding that the expert was 
entitled to, inter alia, a $350 hourly rate and ordering that the expert “be paid a 50% down 
payment on the estimated fee seven days in advance of his deposition”); and then citing In re 
“Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 105 F.R.D. 577, 582 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (ordering that the 
plaintiffs’ depositions of four of the defendants’ experts in “complex ‘Agent Orange’ 
multidistrict litigation” was “conditioned on plaintiffs’ payment of reasonable experts’ fees 
and expenses incurred in discovery”)). 
 137  For a painstaking example of these dynamics, see Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., No. 4:05-
CV-0273-HLM, 2007 WL 9712069, at *2–3 (N.D. Ga. July 24, 2007).  In that case, the court 
described dozens of back-and-forth communications among counsel, including letters and 
emails to and from the expert: 
         The total amount I will therefore need in advice [sic] to forward to 
her is $2,890.00 total or $963.33 per defendant.  The above is based upon 
the assumption the 8 hours of deposition time can be completed within 
one day if we begin at 9:00 a.m.? . . . 
         “I need to once again try to clarify Charly Miller’s fees.  IN 
ADDITION TO THE COST OFAIRFARE [sic], HOTEL, TAXI, FOOD 
AND HER DEPOSITION TIME, [s]he charges $50.00 per hour portal to 
portal which means she will be traveling away from home about 48 hours.  
It takes about 12 hours to get here.  She lives about 3 hours from the 
airport.  Even if we met in Atlanta for the deposition, she would still need 
2 nights because YOU ALMOST CANNOT GET HERE FROM THERE. 
ALL SAID, I NEED CONFIRMATION THAT THIS IS ACCEPTABLE 
AND SHE WILL BE PAID OR WE NEED TO FLY TO NEBRASKA. 
Id. (third and fourth alternations in original).  The final dollar amount awarded to plaintiff’s 
expert was $4011.55, approximately $660.00 more than the deposing counsel offered and 
$890.00 less than the retaining party demanded.  Id. at *8. 
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requirements regarding timing of fees.  At the other end of the spectrum from 
cases in which fees are requested before the deposition lie those cases in 
which no mention is made of payment for expert’s fees until the conclusion 
of the litigation.  Thus, rather than requesting payment at or around the time 
of the expert’s deposition, the retaining lawyer requests such a payment at 
the conclusion of the case.138 
Courts have handled disputes about the timing of the fee request with 
mixed results.  Many courts enforce the rule’s fee shifting language 
regardless of when the request for fees is made.139  These courts frequently 
note the Advisory Committee’s statement that the court may issue an order 
to pay fees as a condition of discovery “or may delay the order until after 
discovery[,]” as indicative of the propriety of a fee request at any point in the 
litigation.140  These courts also note that, whether expressly requested by 
counsel at the time or not, “the Federal Rules plainly provide that notice.”141 
Some courts, however, decline to award fees if the retaining party waits 
too long to request them.  In such situations, the court may decide that fee 
shifting is not permitted due to the parties’ failure to discuss it around the 
time of the deposition, which created an implied agreement between the 
parties not to shift fees.142  At least one court, in refusing to shift expert 
 
 138  Sometimes parties request such fees under Rule 26.  Other times, parties request 
reimbursement for the experts’ fees under Rule 54, which allows the prevailing party in a case 
to recover certain costs.  FED. R. CIV. P. 54.  Notably, Rule 54’s utility is constrained in two 
ways: first, it only applies to the prevailing party and second, it only applies to cases in which 
there is a final judgment entered.  Id. 
 139  See, e.g., Ndubizu v. Drexel Univ., No. 07-3068, 2011 WL 6046816, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 
Nov. 16, 2011) (“The fact that Defendants requested payment of expert fees for the first time 
after judgment was entered . . . does not preclude us from granting the motion.” (citing Ellis 
v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1011 (10th Cir. 1996))).  “In Ellis, the court emphasized 
that ‘Rule 26(b)(4)(C) itself does not specify whether or when a party must demand payment 
of fees to its expert.’”  Id. (first citing Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1011; then citing Rogers v. Penland, 
232 F.R.D. 581, 582 (E.D. Tex. 2005); and then citing Fisher-Price, Inc. v. Safety 1st, Inc., 
217 F.R.D. 329, 330 (D. Del. 2003)). 
 140  See, e.g., Neutral Tandem, Inc. v. Peerless Network, Inc., No. 08 C 3402, 2011 WL 
13199213, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2011) (quoting Chambers v. Ingram, 858 F.2d 351, 360–
61 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
In Chambers v. Ingram, the plaintiff prevailed in a jury verdict against 
the defendant. . . .  The plaintiff argued that his costs, however, were 
recoverable under Rule 26(b)(4)(C).  The defendant objected because the 
plaintiff did not request the expert fees and costs at the time of the 
deposition.  The Seventh Circuit noted that the Advisory Committee notes 
to Rule 26(b) stated that the court may issue an order to pay fees as a 
condition of discovery “or may delay the order until after discovery.”  
Thus, the court held, “we do not believe that the timing of the plaintiff’s 
request for this discovery is a bar to recovery under the rule.” 
Id. (citing 858 F.2d at 360–61). 
 141  Ndubizu, 2011 WL 6046816, at *4. 
 142  See Matthews v. United States, 756 F. Supp. 511, 515 (D. Kan. 1991) (“The court is 
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discovery fees post-trial under the rule, has expressed hostility to attempts to 
shift fees post-judgment, calling the party’s request for such fees a “late-
blooming argument” and “just silly.”143  The Court stated that 
Rule 26(b)(4)(C) . . . is a discovery rule, it applies equally to both 
sides, and if the parties had intended to charge one another for the 
time their numerous experts spent in responding to discovery, they 
should have raised the issue at the initial Rule 16 conference, or at 
least at some point before the discovery was undertaken.144 
2. Disputes Regarding Fee Requests When the Expert’s 
Mandatory Disclosures and Report are Deficient 
Occasionally, litigants ask courts to deny fee shifting on grounds that 
the expert failed to comply with Rule 26(a)(2)(B).145  Experts are required to 
disclose, before their deposition,146 a report that provides their opinions in a 
 
without legal authority under Rule 26(b)(4)(C) to order payment of fees and expenses incurred 
in taking the deposition of plaintiff’s expert witness.  Presumably, the deposition was taken 
upon the parties’ agreement subject to whatever conditions and terms that were reached.”). 
 143  Leggett & Platt, Inc. v. Vutek, Inc., No. 4:05CV788 CDP, 2007 WL 607736, at *1 
(E.D. Mo. Feb. 22, 2007). 
 144  Id.  In that case, the court’s hostility was likely based in part on the fact that the 
retaining party was seeking “expert witness fees of almost a million dollars.”  Id.  The party 
seeking the fees also was the prevailing party, so although the court cites Rule 26(b)(4)(C), it 
also references the fact that “that provision has nothing to do with a prevailing party’s right 
to recover costs[,]” suggesting perhaps that the request was made in the context of a bill of 
costs.  Id.  Still, other courts have treated a request for expert discovery fees submitted as part 
of a bill of costs as nonetheless compensable under Rule 26(b)(4)(C).  See, e.g., Halasa v. ITT 
Educ. Servs., Inc., 690 F.3d 844, 850 (7th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases in which the “district 
courts have taken different approaches to the way in which § 1821 applies to motions for costs 
under Rule 26(b)(4)(E) when those particular items are also addressed in § 1821” (citations 
omitted)). 
 145  This issue comes up with some regularity, so much so that a federal practice form for 
expert fee motions includes this argument.  See, e.g., 3A JAY E. GRENIG, WEST’S FEDERAL 
FORMS § 21:37 (5th ed.), Westlaw (database updated 2018). 
It has been argued, in informal discussion of this matter (i.e. at the pretrial 
conference), that Plaintiffs had a choice as to whether to depose the 
defense experts, and, having made that choice, should pay the cost of 
doing so.  This is, it is respectfully submitted, a specious argument.  In 
the absence of making discovery, Plaintiffs would have been fatally 
disadvantaged at trial.  The defense expert reports, for the most part, 
contained nothing more than net opinions.  Few set forth the materials 
reviewed or the facts on which the experts intended to rely.  None set 
forth compensation or a listing of other cases in which the witness has 
testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four 
years. 
Id. 
 146  The requirement that expert disclosures come before the deposition appears in a 
different rule—the rule that permits parties to depose the opposing expert.  See FED. R. CIV. 
P. 26(b)(4)(A).  This rule provides that “[a] party may depose any person who has been 
identified as an expert whose opinions may be presented at trial.  If Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires 
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given case, the bases for such opinions, the documents examined and relied 
upon, as well as information about their background, experience, prior 
testimony, and fee schedule.  Disclosures exist for a reason.  For example, 
one court has explained the significance of disclosure of prior testimony as 
the way “to give the other party access to useful information to meet the 
proposed experts’ opinions” and noted that “[t]he proliferation of marginal 
or unscrupulous experts will only be stopped when the other party has 
detailed information about prior testimony.”147 
Thus, when experts fall short in their disclosures, litigants may argue 
that the failure to disclose should negate, or at least reduce, the shifting of 
fees.  The argument is premised on the fact that a deposition under such 
circumstances is not only necessary, but also necessarily longer, absent 
complete and accurate disclosures.148 
In one case, the deposing party “argue[d] that he should not be required 
to reimburse Defendants because the reports submitted by some of the 
experts were deficient under the Federal Rules’ disclosure requirements.”149  
The “expert’s noncompliance with this provision,” the litigant argued, “is a 
deficiency that renders reimbursement of that expert’s fees unreasonable.”150  
The court acknowledged that the experts had failed to include required 
information in their reports.151  Although recognizing this deficiency and the 
impact on the deposing party having “to spend time in a deposition 
 
a report from the expert, the deposition may be conducted only after the report is provided.”  
Id. (emphasis added).  “[T]he disclosure of prior recorded testimony is designed to give the 
other party access to useful information to meet the proposed experts’ opinions.  The 
proliferation of marginal or unscrupulous experts will only be stopped when the other party 
has detailed information about prior testimony.”  Elgas v. Colo. Belle Corp., 179 F.R.D. 296, 
300 (D. Nev. 1998). 
 147  Elgas, 179 F.R.D. 296 at 300. 
 148  See generally Motion in Limine by Defendant, Stanczyk v. Prudential Insur. Co. of 
Am., No. 1:15-cv-0097 (N.D. Iowa Apr. 28, 2017), 2017 WL 1632874.  The author litigated 
a case in which the opposing expert testified that he had participated in hundreds of cases, yet 
failed to disclose a list of his prior testimony as required by the rule.  Instead, he brazenly 
stated in his expert disclosure: “Let me note that I have never maintained a list of cases of 
medical record reviews, Independent Medical Examination, depositions, or trial appearances.  
Thus, I am unable to produce any list of my prior work where I have been asked to serve as 
an expert.”  That same expert, nonetheless, characterized the nature of his prior testimony as 
“pro-defendant” in an effort to bolster the credibility of his opinions on behalf of the Plaintiff 
in that case: “In general probably 90 percent of my work is defense work.”; “And, you know, 
I think it’s important to note that I call things the way they are. I’m pretty well-known for 
doing that.  And the majority of my work is defense work.”  There is no realistic way for a 
party to test the accuracy and veracity of an expert’s characterization of his prior testimony, 
and its consistency with testimony in the case at hand, without having access to his prior 
testimony.  See generally id.  
 149  Ndubizu v. Drexel Univ., No. 07-3068, 2011 WL 6046816, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 
2011). 
 150  Id. 
 151  See id. 
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developing that information when it should have been included in the 
report[,]” the court deemed that “impact” to be “nominal.”152  It reduced each 
experts’ compensation by one-half hour, which likely covered but a fraction 
of the amount the deposing party incurred in litigating the issue.153 
In another case, the deposing party contended that it should not have to 
pay for the experts’ depositions because the experts had failed to disclose 
their hourly rate as required under Rule 26(a)(2)(B).154  It argued that it 
should not have to pay the experts’ allegedly “‘excessive’ charges which [it] 
would not have agreed to pay had [it] known the experts’ rates before the 
depositions.”155  The court disagreed, stating that “the fact that the fees were 
not agreed to or disclosed ahead of time does not preclude defendant from 
seeking reimbursement for its experts under Rule 26.”156  It reasoned that, 
because “the timing of a party’s request for discovery cost is not a bar to 
recovery under Rule 26[,]” the fact that the experts’ rates were not known in 
advance was not consequential.157  While that reasoning is consistent with 
several courts’ admonishments that litigants should bring fee disputes to the 
 
 152  Id.  In another case, Garnier v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., the expert demanded advance 
payment of $4000 seven days before the scheduled deposition, yet had not provided adequate 
expert disclosure.  No. 04CV1825(NGG)(KAM), 2006 WL 1085080, at *1, *4 (E.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 24, 2006).  The deposing party thus requested that the court order that the fees for the 
soon-to-occur deposition not be shifted due to the disclosure failure.  Id. at *4.  The court 
simply ordered the plaintiff to do what the rule already had required, stating: “[T]hey shall 
furnish to plaintiff complete expert disclosures, including court information, docket numbers, 
party and counsel names, and dates, for [the expert] in accordance with Rule 26 within three 
business days of the entry of this order.”  Id. (citing Coleman v. Dydula, 190 F.R.D. 316, 318 
(W.D.N.Y. 1999) (Rule 26(a)(a)(B) requires disclosure of “the list of cases in which the 
witness has testified[, which] should at a minimum include the name of the court or 
administrative agency where the testimony occurred, the names of the parties, the case 
number, and whether the testimony was given at a deposition or trial”)).  While an order to 
comply was no doubt necessary, without any consequences other than the already-existing 
obligation to comply with the rule, it is unlikely the order would have much effect on that 
expert or the retaining party the next time around.  Indeed Rule 37(a)(3)(A), which governs 
discovery sanctions, already requires compliance without a motion to compel.  See FED. R. 
CIV. P. 37(a)(3)(A); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 2289.1 (“The sanction is 
automatic in the sense that there is no need for the opposing party to make a motion to compel 
disclosure, as authorized by Rule 37(a)(3)(A) in order to compel a further disclosure, as a 
predicate for imposition of the sanction of exclusion.”). 
 153  Indeed, the costs involved in disputing fees discourages some litigants from 
challenging patently unreasonable fee awards.  As one commentator has explained: “[T]he 
cost of challenging excessive fees can, in some instances, be greater than simply paying the 
fee in the first place.  So again, the fees get paid.”  Canepa, supra note 2. 
 154  This Rule requires “a statement of the compensation to be paid for the study and 
testimony in the case.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(vi). 
 155  Handi-Craft Co. v. Action Trading, S.A., No. 4:02 CV 1731 LMB, 2003 WL 
26098543, at *18 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 25, 2003). 
 156  Id. 
 157  Id. (citing Chambers v. Ingram, 858 F.2d 351, 360–61 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
SHELTON (DO NOT DELETE) 2/11/2019  12:14 PM 
2019] DISCOVERY OF EXPERT WITNESSES 515 
court “after the deposition has been completed,”158 the court failed to 
acknowledge the difference between the disclosure of fees versus an 
agreement about fees—the former of which is required by the rule. 
While not highly litigated, this aspect of the rule would nonetheless 
benefit from making explicit what is implicit.  Namely, at its core, the fee 
shifting rule contemplates that there has been a full and accurate disclosure, 
including a complete report.159  It is that extensive disclosure that forms the 
rationale behind the fee shifting rule and, specifically, why it is fair to shift 
fees.  When that implicit tradeoff—fees shifting in exchange for a full and 
thorough disclosure—breaks down because of incomplete disclosure, so too 
does the underlying rationale and fairness behind the fee shifting rule. 
3. Disputes Regarding the Process for Handling and Enforcing 
Fee Disputes 
The rule contains no mention of the process for handling and enforcing 
fee disputes.  It does not mention when and how a party should bring the 
dispute to court, nor does it address who bears the burden of proof.  
Complicating that void is the rule’s overarching language that makes the fee 
shifting mandatory “unless manifest injustice would result.”  Taken together, 
these aspects of the rule create unnecessary (or unnecessarily costly) 
litigation and strike the wrong balance. 
Courts appear to uniformly hold that it is the retaining party that bears 
the burden of proof on the question of fee shifting.160  Plaintiffs, in this case, 
bear the burden of establishing that each expert’s fee is reasonable.161  If an 
expert’s fee is unreasonable, the Court may, in its discretion, simply fashion 
a reasonable alternative.162 
 
 158  AP Links, LLC v. Russ, No. CV 09-5437 (JS) (AKT), 2015 WL 9050298, at *2 
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2015) (“If the parties are unable to agree upon the reasonableness of [the 
expert]’s fee, they may make an application to the Court after the deposition has been 
completed.” (first citing Conte v. Newsday, Inc., No. CV 06-4859 (JFB) (ETB), 2011 WL 
3511071, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2011); and then citing Biernacki v. United States, No. 11-
CV-973(Sr), 2012 WL 6100291, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2012))). 
 159  See supra Part II.A, B. 
 160  In the author’s experience, it is not uncommon for the retaining attorney to pass along 
the expert’s invoice, which may be sorely lacking in detail or description despite requesting a 
large sum, as if the retaining lawyer is nothing more than the courier.  The rule encourages 
this mentality to the extent it does not suggest rigorous scrutiny at any juncture of whether the 
requested fee should be shifted, but instead seems to imply a rubber stamp in all but the most 
extreme situations.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(E). 
 161  See Fiber Optic Designs, Inc. v. New Eng. Pottery, LLC, 262 F.R.D. 586, 589 (D. 
Colo. 2009). 
 162  See Nester v. Textron, Inc., No. 1:13-CV-920 RP, 2016 WL 6537991, at *5 (W.D. 
Tex. Nov. 3, 2016) (“Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that each expert’s fee is 
reasonable under Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i).  If an expert’s fee is unreasonable, the Court may, at its 
discretion, fashion a reasonable alternative.” (citing Fiber Optic Designs, Inc., 262 F.R.D. at 
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But saying that the retaining party bears the burden of proof and 
actually holding the party to that burden are two different matters.  In 
numerous cases, courts suggest that both parties failed to explain why or why 
not the fees billed were reasonable, even though that burden lies with only 
one party.163  And even when there is a noted lack of evidentiary support 
regarding the reasonableness of fees, courts still largely award such fees with 
only minor reductions.164  Likewise, in cases in which the lack of evidence 
produced by the party who bears the burden of proof renders the court unable 
to assess a critical factor, the courts still award fees and simply ignore that 
missing factor.165 
Despite how few words the rule contains, it decidedly puts a thumb on 
the scale in favor of fee shifting in two separate places, no matter how large 
the bill or extreme the claimed fees.  First, it states that fees shift “unless 
manifest injustice” would result, implying that there has to be an 
exceptionally compelling reason not to shift fees.166  Second, it says that the 
 
589; then citing Jensen v. Lawler, 338 F. Supp. 2d 739, 747 (S.D. Tex. 2004); and then citing 
Borel v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 265 F.R.D. 275, 276 (E.D. La. 2010))); Ball v. LeBlanc, No 
13-00368-BAJ-SCR, 2015 WL 5793929, at *1 (M.D. La. Sept. 30, 2015). 
 163  See, e.g., EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 5481 LBS AJP, 1999 WL 
32909, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1999) (“And because neither the EEOC nor J & H has 
provided the Court with any useful information about other factors, the Court . . . will focus 
on the rate the expert usually charges and the rate the expert charges the retaining party (here, 
J & H), tempered by the Court’s sense of what is unreasonable.” (citing McClain v. Owens-
Corning Fiberglas Corp., No. 89 C 6226, 1996 WL 650524, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 1996) 
(“The court may use its discretion, however, where the parties offer scant evidence in support 
of their positions” as to reasonable expert fees.))). 
 164  See, e.g., Reit v. Post Props., Inc., No. 09 Civ. 5455(RMB)(KNF), 2010 WL 4537044, 
at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2010) (acknowledging that the retaining party “failed to submit 
competent evidence . . . to support Dr. Head’s request for compensation” and thus “did not 
meet [its] burden of showing that Dr. Head’s requested fees are reasonable[,]” yet concluding 
in the apparent absence of evidence that “$400 is a reasonable hourly fee for Dr. Head’s 
preparation time as well as his deposition time”). 
 165  See, e.g., Garnier v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., No. 04CV1825(NGG)(KAM), 2006 WL 
1085080, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2006). 
         With respect to the fee actually being charged to the retaining party, 
defendants’ counsel, in response to this Court’s order, has represented 
that Dr. Glass cannot in good faith estimate the time he expended 
examining plaintiff and preparing a report of that examination.  The Court 
is troubled by this position, given that Dr. Glass has testified as an expert 
in over 500 cases, and claims to have examined “thousands of plaintiffs 
and defendants in civil law suits.”  Dr. Glass should be able to estimate 
the amount of time he expended in this case, but has not done so.  In any 
event, this factor is not dispositive; instead, the Court must balance the 
defendants’ need for competent experts with the need to protect the 
opposing party with being “unfairly burdened by excessive ransoms 
which produce windfalls for the defendants’ expert.” 
Id. (alterations in original omitted) (quoting Magee v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 172 F.R.D. 
627, 645 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)).  
 166  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(E). 
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court “must order” the fee shifting.167  Of course, the rule also says that only 
“reasonable fees” are shifted.168  Yet, in failing to set parameters as to what 
is reasonable, the rule leaves wide discretion to courts already predisposed 
to shift whatever fees are billed.  Likewise, the rule’s lack of attention to 
what level of scrutiny and oversight the court should apply undermines 
whatever teeth the “reasonable fees” language was intended to supply, and 
stands in stark contrast to any other fee-shifting rule.  So, while it is true that 
a few courts have scrutinized and drastically limited the amount of fees that 
are shifted,169 those courts are in the minority. 
 
 
 167  The MDL Protocol resolves much of this ambiguity regarding how disputes are 
handled by establishing protocols that favors the presumptive fee request. MDL PROTOCOL, 
supra note 69.  Most notably, the protocol establishes methods of resolution for disputes 
regarding fees, such as providing that a party must “disput[e] the reasonableness of an expert’s 
deposition fee . . . within thirty (30) days upon receipt of the expert’s invoice” or be deemed 
to have waived any objection to the fees.  Id. ¶ 9.  The protocol further specifies that if a party 
has to file a motion to compel for payment of expert fees, “to the extent the motion proves 
successful, at the discretion of the court the moving party may be entitled to assess from the 
delinquent party the costs of collecting including reasonable attorney fees.”  Id. ¶ 10.  The 
protocol does not contain a similar paragraph for shifting attorneys’ fees to the deposing party 
if the motion proves unsuccessful.  
 168  Auto. Rentals, Inc. v. Keith Huber, Inc., No. 1:10CV385-LG-RHW, 2012 WL 
12854841, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 10, 2012) (“[T]he Court ‘has discretion to limit or alter those 
costs if they appear to be unreasonable.’” (quoting Knight v. Kirby Inland Marine Inc., 482 
F.3d 347, 356 (5th Cir. 2007))). 
 169  For example, one court recognized the risk of abuse in expert fee shifting: 
         To be sure, we live in an age where a grown man may be paid a 
seven figure annual salary to dribble a small round ball.  But, the forces 
of the marketplace are at work in such a situation: not only supply and 
demand, but the variegated effects of the superstar’s presence on 
attendance, television revenues, and the all-hallowed won/lost record.  
And, most important, the employer and the employee square off and 
bargain at arm’s length in order to determine an equitable stipend, each 
with something to lose and something to gain. In the Rule 26(b)(4)(C) 
context, however, such factors are noticeably absent; the plaintiffs have 
handpicked the expert, and the defense has neither options nor bargaining 
power if it desires to obtain the pretrial discovery which the rule permits.  
Unless the courts patrol the battlefield to insure fairness, the 
circumstances invite extortionate fee-setting. 
         In the final analysis, the mandate of Rule 26(b)(4)(C) is not that an 
adverse expert will be paid his heart’s desire, but that he will be paid a 
“reasonable fee.”  The ultimate goal must be to calibrate the balance so 
that a plaintiff will not be unduly hampered in his/her efforts to attract 
competent experts, while at the same time, an inquiring defendant will 
not be unfairly burdened by excessive ransoms which produce windfalls 
for the plaintiff’s experts.  Decisionmaking in this entropic field must be 
fair to the parties, equitable vis-a-vis the witness, and comprehensible to 
the community at large. 
Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., No. 4:05-CV-0273-HLM, 2007 WL 9712069, at *6–7 (N.D. Ga. 
July 24, 2007) (quoting Anthony v. Abbott Labs., 106 F.R.D. 461, 464–65 (D.R.I. 1985)). 
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Exacerbating the problem is the lack of consequences for unfair play 
under the rule.  It is almost unheard of in the context of Rule 26(b)(4)(E) for 
the court to award attorneys’ fees to the party that prevails on the fee-shifting 
motion.  For example, even when a court recognizes deficiencies or 
unreasonableness in one party’s fee demand, it still does not award attorneys’ 
fees.  For example, in AP Links, LLC, the deposing party brought a motion 
to require the expert to appear for his deposition.  The expert had refused to 
appear unless the deposing party paid him a flat fee in advance of the 
deposition. The case was pending in the Eastern District of New York, a 
jurisdiction that had well-established law that an expert “may not insist on 
advance payment, and may not set a flat fee before he knows what he will be 
called upon to do.”170  Even so, the court refused to award attorneys’ fees to 
the party that was forced to bring the motion, stating: 
         Finally, the request by Plaintiffs’ counsel that he be awarded 
attorneys’ fees in connection with bringing the instant motion is 
DENIED.  Plaintiffs’ counsel has not cited any case law in support 
of his conclusory request, nor has he identified the rule or legal 
authority demonstrating his entitlement to the relief he seeks.  The 
parties are cautioned that if, going forward, the Court finds that 
either party is not operating in good faith with regard to the issues 
referenced in this Order, the Court will take appropriate action.171 
It is hard to understand the court’s statement that the moving party did not 
“identif[y] the rule . . . demonstrating his entitlement” to fees given that the 
motion, like all discovery disputes, clearly falls under the purview of Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 37.  In addition, the court’s reticence to shift 
attorneys’ fee is a little ironic since the underlying rule is a fee-shifting 
provision, such that relative fairness concerns should be heightened. 
C. Policy Problems: Issues Arising from the Rule’s Overbreadth 
In some of the areas in which the rule is clear, it strikes the wrong 
balance.  First, it does so by requiring fee shifting even for discovery of 
experts who have not submitted expert reports.  Second, it does this by 
invoking the term “unless manifest injustice would result.” 
 
 170  AP Links, LLC v. Russ, No. CV 09-5437 (JS) (AKT), 2015 WL 9050298, at *3 
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2015) (quoting Johnson v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., No. CV 07-1874 (FB)(JO), 
2008 WL 1995117, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 6, 2008)). 
 171  Id.; see also Rote v. Zel Custom Mfg. LLC, No. 2:13-cv-1189, 2018 WL 2093619, at 
*6 (S.D. Ohio May 7, 2018) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(iii) and denying moving 
party’s “request for attorney’s fees incurred in bringing this Motion . . . as unjust under the 
circumstances”).  As ironic as it may be, the one case in which a court entertained the 
possibility of awarding attorneys’ fees, the attorney had not requested them: “Defendant . . . 
did not request an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses in its Motion.  If Defendant . . . had 
made such a request, the Court would have given serious consideration to granting it.”  Mann, 
2007 WL 9712069, at 8 n.4.  
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1. The Problem with Shifting Fees for Experts Who Have Not 
Submitted Reports 
The fee shifting rule applies to discovery of all experts, but some 
experts are not subject to the mandatory disclosures and do not have to 
submit reports.  These experts, sometimes called “non-retained experts,” are 
experts who are “not retained or specially employed to provide expert 
testimony in the case.”172 
Numerous reasons exist as to why experts who do not have to provide 
a report should not be included in the fee shifting rule.  The expert discovery 
fee shifting rule is premised on the fact that the expert to be deposed has 
already provided a complete and detailed disclosure and report, and thus a 
deposition is viewed as less necessary and more discretionary.  Therefore, 
similar to the argument that fees should not shift when an expert submits an 
incomplete or deficient report,173 the argument is that, with no report, a 
deposition is hardly a luxury but rather a necessity. 
In addition, the expert discovery rule is premised on the proposition that 
it is “unfair” for the deposing party to get for free what the other party had 
to pay for—a proposition that has no validity in the context of an expert who 
has not submitted a report.  By their very nature, experts who are not required 
to submit reports have not been retained, and thus have not been paid by one 
party for opinions reached and work performed in the litigation.  
Accordingly, there exists no concern that the deposing party will “get for 
free” what the other party has had to pay for.  Finally, the deposition of an 
expert who has not provided a report will likely take longer.  Thus, the 
potential “unfairness” cuts in the opposite direction, insofar as it is unfair for 
the deposing party to have to pay for the expert to sort through what her 
opinions are, the bases for them, and more during the deposition. 
2. The Problem with Shifting Fees for Experts Who Are the 
Party’s Employee 
For somewhat similar reasons, it is problematic to include experts who 
are “the party’s employee” under the fee shifting rule.  First, only large, 
corporate defendants are likely to have such employees and thus are the only 
parties who benefit from such a rule.  Second, an expert “whose duties as the 
 
 172  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B) (“Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, this 
disclosure must be accompanied by a written report—prepared and signed by the witness—if 
the witness is one retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or 
one whose duties as the party’s employee regularly involve giving expert testimony.”).  It is 
beyond the scope of this Article to address which experts fall into which categories—suffice 
to say that is a less-than-clear delineation, e.g., should a treating physician be treated as an 
expert that must provide a report.  See Shea, Kreps & Solade, supra note 1, at 1. 
 173  See supra Part III.B.2.  
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party’s employee regularly involve giving expert testimony” most likely is 
salaried and thus has no market-based hourly rate.  In addition, not shifting 
such an expert’s fees does not raise the fairness concerns that exist with 
regard to specially retained experts.  It is typical for a party to pay for the 
time its own employee, whether a layperson or expert witness, spends 
responding to discovery.  Litigation is, by definition, burdensome and 
expensive for parties, and responding to discovery is one of the biggest 
burdens.  Even so, the discovery rules do not provide for fee shifting, and 
parties already incur significant discovery-related expenses occasioned by 
the other side’s discovery requests and performed for the other side’s benefit.  
If those requests are irrelevant, unduly burdensome, or otherwise 
objectionable, the party has the ability to seek a protective order.  No 
justification exists to treat discovery costs related to a party’s expert 
employee any differently than those costs for non-expert employees. 
3. Problems Arising from the “Unless Manifest Injustice Would 
Result” Language 
The rule’s introductory language that a court must require that an 
expert’s “reasonable fees” be shifted “[u]nless manifest injustice would 
result” is also problematic.174  Such language is more commonly found in 
rules of criminal law and procedure than in a rule of civil procedure.175  In 
any event, what “manifest injustice” entails is not defined in the rule.176  The 
advisory notes to the rule suggest that the standard relates only to the ability 
of the deposing party to pay.177  Thus, as one court has described it: “Implicit 
in the ‘manifest injustice’ caveat[] is that a ‘rich’ party should not be allowed 
to agree to pay excessively high fees to its expert in order to prevent a 
‘poorer’ opposing party from being able to afford to depose the expert.”178  
 
 174  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(E). 
 175  See GRENIG, supra note 145, § 21:37 (discussing areas in which the “manifest 
injustice” standard arises, including “retroactive application of statutory provisions” and 
“departure on manifest injustice ground” under Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 16 governing pretrial orders).  Notably, in Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 16(e), which permits the court to modify the final pretrial order “only to prevent 
manifest injustice,” unlike Rule 26, the rest of the rule contains detailed substantive and 
procedural provisions that explain and justify the “manifest injustice” language.  FED. R. CIV. 
P. 16(e). 
 176  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(2)(b)(4)(E). 
 177  See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 2034 n.28 (“Even in cases where the court is 
directed to issue a protective order, it may decline to do so if it finds that manifest injustice 
would result. Thus, the court can protect, when necessary and appropriate, the interests of an 
indigent party.” (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment)). 
 178  EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 5481 LBS AJP, 1999 WL 32909, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1999) (citing Pudela v. Swanson, No. 91 C 3559, 1993 WL 532546, at *3 
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 1993) (“Plaintiffs may have less financial resources than defendants, but 
they are not ‘indigent’ . . . [and] this court perceives no injustice in requiring them to pay the 
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Even so, other courts suggest that the “unless manifest injustice would 
result” language serves as a general safeguard against unreasonable fee 
shifting.179  The case law, however, reveals that to be more aspirational than 
actual—other than a party’s abject inability to pay, the manifest injustice 
language provides no safeguard.180 
To the contrary, the unintended effect of that language has been to 
justify the lack of scrutiny applied to experts’ fee requests.  It is not 
uncommon for courts to rubber-stamp the shifting of extraordinary expert 
fees on grounds that the fees do not offend the “manifest injustice” caveat.  
Because that reflects a misunderstanding of the limited safeguard that the 
language actually supplies, the impact of the rule’s limited safeguard—that 
the fees must be “reasonable”—ends up being minimized.181 
Experts come in all forms—some charge exorbitant rates and tack on 
fees to their invoices for anything remotely related to the deposition, whereas 
others err on the side of caution, and charge only for actual time spent in the 
deposition.  The thumb on the scale that arises from the “unless manifest 
injustice would result” standard incentivizes and rewards less scrupulous 
experts to shift greater expenses, while at the same time disincentivizing the 
deposing party from challenging such fees. 
IV.  OVERALL IMPACT OF CURRENT RULE’S SHORTCOMINGS 
Fee shifting of any variety is extraordinary in the American legal 
system and perhaps for good reason—the inherent and unintended 
consequences of fee shifting are many.182  Thus, on the rare occasion in 
 
fees charged by their opponents’ experts for time spent in testimony at deposition.”) (“That, 
however, is not the case here.  There is no disparity between J & H’s and the EEOC’s ability 
to afford experts.”)). 
 179  See, e.g., Reit v. Post Props., Inc., No. 09 Civ. 5455(RMB)(KNF), 2010 WL 4537044, 
at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2010)  (“Absent any evidence that manifest injustice would result 
from failing to pay Dr. Head for the time he ‘reserved’ for the March 12, 2010 deposition, the 
Court finds that charge to be unreasonable.”). 
 180  In Rogers v. Penland, the district court did reference the “manifest injustice” standard 
in denying fee-shifting to an expert who was subsequently excluded from the case on Daubert 
grounds: “To require a party to pay for the costs of a witness who was not even called, and 
against whom the court had sustained a Daubert challenge is manifestly unjust.”  232 F.R.D. 
581, 583 (E.D. Tex. 2005). 
 181  See Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., No. 4:05-CV-0273-HLM, 2007 WL 9712069, at *6 
(N.D. Ga. July 24, 2007) (“The mandatory language of the rule is tempered by two limitations: 
1) the costs may not be imposed if doing so would result in manifest injustice, and 2) the 
expert’s fees must be reasonable.” (quoting Gwin v. Am. River Transp. Co., 482 F.3d 969, 
975 (7th Cir. 2007))).  
 182  While these reasons are beyond the scope of this Article, for an interesting discussion 
of them, see David A. Root, Note, Attorney Fee-Shifting in America: Comparing, 
Contrasting, and Combining the “American Rule” and “English Rule”, 15 IND. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 583, 607–09 (2005).  
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which fee shifting is permitted, the statute or rule is typically carefully 
worded to achieve its purpose.  Not so with Rule 26(b)(4)(E), however.  That 
rule represents an anomaly not only from the typical ebb and flow of 
litigation, but also from other fee shifting rules.  Despite its drastic impact—
forcing one side to pay the other side’s expert that it neither selected nor 
entered into an arm’s length agreement with—the rule is plagued by the 
problems detailed in Part III. Taken together, these problems impact civil 
litigation involving experts in numerous, global ways. 
First, disputes about the rule’s interpretation abound because there is 
no clarity or uniformity regarding what types of fees the rule covers or 
standards for reasonableness.  These disputes cost litigants and the courts 
time and money, and are avoidable with a better drafted rule. 
Second, the lack of uniformity is anathema to the federal rules, which 
are premised on the uniform application of rules in the federal court system. 
Third, discovery fees are often shifted even when the expert’s work was 
not controlled by or for the benefit of the deposing party.  This is not only 
unfair to the deposing party, but likely results in experts being paid 
unreasonable sums. 
Fourth, the rule lacks mechanisms to fairly and efficiently shift fees 
and, in particular, provide the parties with proper incentives.  Ideally, the 
retaining party and expert should be incentivized to only bill for truly 
reasonable fees, and the deposing party should be incentivized to only pay 
for truly reasonable fees. 
Fifth, the rule strikes the wrong balance in terms of the courts’ 
involvement.  It tends to disincentivize and minimize a court’s role in the 
areas in which a court is most sorely needed while involving the court for 
matters that are of little consequence. 
Sixth, the problems with the rule are not resolving themselves, thus 
necessitating correction by amendment.  The rule’s lack of clarity, combined 
with the dearth of appellate review, has resulted in long-standing 
inconsistency. 
V.  FIXING THE RULE: PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE RULE AND BENEFITS 
When a rule consistently yields inconsistent interpretations and unfair 
results, as this rule has for almost twenty-five years, it is time to amend it.183  
The proposed changes to the rule are set forth below, followed by an 
explanation of the changes and related benefits. 
 
 183  While the rule has been in effect for longer, the 1993 amendment that freely permitted 
expert depositions triggered the slew of problems discussed in this Article.  See supra note 
30.  
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A. Proposed Amended Rule 26(b)(4)(E) 
The proposed amended rule is below, the version showing the changes 
is first, followed by a clean version that incorporates all of the changes. 
 
Revised Rule Showing All Changes Proposed to Current Rule 
Unless manifest injustice would result, The Except as provided in part 
(vi), the court must require that the party seeking discovery . . . pay the an 
expert who is required to submit a report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) a reasonable 
hourly fee for time spent in responding to discovery under Rule 
26(b)(4)(A):.” 
(i) “Time spent responding to discovery” includes only: (1) the actual time 
the expert spends in a deposition, including any breaks during the day, 
and does not include time or fees spent preparing for a deposition, 
traveling to or from a deposition, reviewing a deposition transcript, or 
time otherwise relating to being deposed; and (2) time the expert spends 
responding to written discovery requests and/or subpoenas served by the 
opposing party that require the expert to perform work that is not already 
required under the disclosure rule. 
(ii) In determining what constitutes “reasonable fees,” the party that retained 
the expert has the burden to prove that the amount billed is reasonable, 
both in terms of hourly rate and the number of hours billed.  The hourly 
rate that the retaining party actually paid for the expert’s work is the 
presumptively reasonable rate. 
(iii) The request for payment of fees may not be filed until after the expert 
discovery has occurred and must include an itemized statement that 
includes the date and purpose for the hours billed, the rate at which each 
hour was billed, and a statement of the hourly rate that the expert has 
been paid by the retaining party.  The request must be personally signed 
and attested to by both the expert and the retaining attorney. 
(iv) Any objection to the request for fees, including an objection arising 
under (vi)(4), must be filed within fourteen days of the date on which the 
request was filed or is deemed waived. 
(v) Unless a resistance to the request for fees has been timely filed: (1) 
payment by the deposing party of the reasonable fees is due within thirty 
(30) days of the date on which the request for fees was filed; and (2) 
interest accumulates daily for any unpaid and due balance at the statutory 
rate for judgments, and is automatically added on to the amount due and 
owing.  If a resistance to the request for fees was timely filed, fees are 
not due until the court enters an order specifying the amount, if any, that 
must be paid.  If the resistance is deemed frivolous, the court shall order 
that interest be paid from the date on which payment was due absent the 
resistance. 
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(vi) No payment is required if: (1) the party that engaged the expert failed to 
comply with and serve complete and accurate disclosures and a report as 
set forth in Rule 26(a)(2)(B) seven or more days before the date of the 
expert’s deposition; (2) the party that engaged the expert fails to file a 
request for fees that complies with part (iii) within 30 days after 
completion of the discovery to which the fee request relates; (3)  the 
witness is the party’s employee; or (4) manifest injustice would result 
due to the financial circumstances of the deposing party. 
 
Revised Rule Incorporating All Proposed Changes 
Except as provided in part (iv), the court must require that the party 
seeking discovery . . . pay an expert who is required to submit a report under 
Rule 26(a)(2)(B) a reasonable hourly fee for time spent in responding to 
discovery under Rule 26(b)(4)(A) 
(i) “Time spent responding to discovery” includes only: (1) the actual time 
the expert spends in a deposition, including any breaks during the day, 
and does not include time or fees spent preparing for a deposition, 
traveling to or from a deposition, reviewing a deposition transcript or 
time otherwise relating to being deposed; and (2) time the expert spends 
responding to written discovery requests and/or subpoenas served by the 
opposing party that require the expert to perform work that is not already 
required under the disclosure rule. 
(ii) In determining what constitutes “reasonable fees,” the party that retained 
the expert has the burden to prove that the amount billed is reasonable, 
both in terms of hourly rate and the number of hours billed.  The hourly 
rate that the retaining party actually paid for the expert’s work is the 
presumptively reasonable rate. 
(iii) The request for payment of fees may not be filed until after the expert 
discovery has occurred and must include an itemized statement that 
includes the date and purpose for the hours billed, the rate at which each 
hour was billed, and a statement of the hourly rate that the expert has 
been paid by the retaining party.  The request must be personally signed 
and attested to by both the expert and the retaining attorney. 
(iv) Any objection to the request for fees, including an objection arising 
under (vi)(4), must be filed within fourteen days of the date on which the 
request was filed or is deemed waived. 
(v) Unless a resistance to the request for fees has been timely filed:  (1) 
payment by the deposing party of the reasonable fees is due within thirty 
(30) days of the date on which the request for fees was filed; and (2) 
interest accumulates daily for any unpaid and due balance at the statutory 
rate for judgments, and is automatically added on to the amount due and 
owing.  If a resistance to the request for fees was timely filed, fees are 
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not due until the court enters an order specifying the amount, if any, that 
must be paid.  If the resistance is deemed frivolous, the court shall order 
that interest be paid from the date on which payment was due absent the 
resistance. 
(vi) No payment is required if:  (1) the party that engaged the expert failed 
to comply with and serve complete and accurate disclosures and a report 
as set forth in Rule 26(a)(2)(B) seven or more days before the date of the 
expert’s deposition; (2) the party that engaged the expert fails to file a 
request for fees that complies with part (iii) within 30 days after 
completion of the discovery to which the fee request relates; (3)  the 
witness is the party’s employee; or (4) manifest injustice would result 
due to the financial circumstances of the deposing party. 
B. Breakdown of Proposed Amendments to the Rule and Related 
Benefits 
1. Changes to “Costs of Responding to Discovery” 
As discussed, many disputes arise under the rule due to the lack of 
clarity and resulting inconsistencies regarding what is included in “costs of 
responding to discovery.”184  The proposed amended rule should eliminate 
virtually all of these disputes because it provides a bright-line definition of 
what that its terms entail.  No longer will parties be uncertain and thus pay 
for questionable fees because it is less expensive than bringing a motion.  
And no longer will courts be asked to examine and resolve whether and 
under what circumstances “preparation time” is covered. 
In addition to the time and resources saved, the amended rule strikes a 
proper balance in terms of what is covered.  Subject to certain caveats 
discussed below, there is no question that an expert should be paid for time 
spent in the deposition, and that time can be fairly and objectively calculated.  
And while it is true that the deposing party is not entirely in control of the 
length of the deposition—i.e., a cagey or verbose expert will necessarily take 
longer to depose—the deposition’s length is most controlled by that party.  
This is especially true given that one of the reasons depositions under the 
current rule take longer than the deposing party controls is due to the lack of 
complete and accurate expert disclosure and report—a problem that is 
directly solved by not shifting fees if the expert has not met his obligation 
before the deposition.185  Thus, the rule’s shifting of fees for time spent in 
the deposition is sound and workable. 
 
 
 184  See supra Part III.A.1. 
 185  See supra Part III.B.2. 
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But, there is no simple way to determine how much preparation time is 
necessitated by the deposition, and even less of a way to determine which 
party benefits from that preparation time.  Further, the difficulty and risks of 
determining whether preparation time and travel time are “reasonable” in 
any given case is very factually-intensive and in most cases not warranted.  
Any benefits of fee shifting in a given case do not justify the overall 
expenditure of courts’ time and resources spent determining which party is 
“responsible” for the fact that the expert is incurring such fees. 
Thus, the best way to ensure that an expert expends and bills for only a 
reasonable amount of preparation time is for that amount to be paid by the 
party that retained the expert.186  As one court exploring this issue concluded, 
“[t]o the extent that the inquiring party wishes to ensure that an expert is 
well-prepared, that party may voluntarily pay for the expert’s preparation 
time.” 
Likewise, by not including travel time and expenses to and from the 
deposition, the rule eliminates disputes about whether and how much travel 
time and expenses are covered, as well as the potential abuse that arises by 
imposing costs on the other party.  Not only has the retaining party not had 
to pay the expert for any travel, but the retaining party also knew about the 
expert’s location and chose to retain the expert knowing the additional fees 
and expenses that would be incurred.  In contrast, the deposing party neither 
selects, nor benefits from, the expert’s location. 
Like lay witnesses who are located outside of the jurisdiction in which 
the lawsuit is pending, parties can and should negotiate where expert 
witnesses should be deposed.  Sometimes the best location will be at the 
expert’s location, in which the parties will have to travel.  Other times it will 
be at the parties’ location, in which case the expert will be required to travel.  
Having the rule provide that expert travel expenses should shift to the 
deposing party unnecessarily changes the incentives by imposing more of 
the expenses of travel on the deposing party.  Because the rationale behind 
expert fee shifting is that one party should not get for free what the other 
party paid for, there is scant rationale for shifting travel expenses, which by 
definition the retaining party has not paid for. 
The amended rule also strikes a fair balance between the parties.  The 
party that hired the expert can and should reasonably anticipate that the costs 
associated with preparing its expert for deposition and the costs associated 
with the expert travelling to and from that deposition are part of that 
engagement.  Despite the new disclosure rules, it remains typical for parties 
in federal cases to depose the opposing expert.187  Thus, those fees are 
 
 186  See Eastman v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 14-cv-00703-WQH (WVG), 2016 WL 795881, 
at *5 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2016). 
 187  See id. (explaining the need not only for deposition but deposition of more than one 
SHELTON (DO NOT DELETE) 2/11/2019  12:14 PM 
2019] DISCOVERY OF EXPERT WITNESSES 527 
foreseeable and reasonably should be part of what the retaining party 
considers as the costs of hiring the expert. 
2. Changes to “Reasonable Fees” 
As discussed, many disputes arise under the rule due to the definitions 
and guidance regarding what constitutes “reasonable fees.”188  First, the 
proposed amendment requires that the expert bill the deposing party at an 
hourly rate, not a flat fee.  In making clear that flat fees are not simply 
“disfavored,” they are not allowed, the amended rule will eliminate the 
disputes that arise regarding the uncertainty of the question of flat fee 
billing.189  Additionally, this change will eliminate a large source of potential 
unfairness in the fee shifting rule: the imposition of a large cost on the 
deposing party that is untethered to the actual amount of time spent being 
deposed. 
Further, the rule is not unfair to the expert or to the retaining party.  Like 
many issues of expert payment, the question is not whether the expert will 
get paid her “flat fee” rate, but instead whether the deposing party must pay 
it.  As one commentator has explained, “If the expert wants a minimum, the 
balance should come from the party who hired him and not from [the 
deposing party].”190 
In addition, the proposed amended rule introduces a presumption that 
the experts’ hourly fee charged to the deposing party should be the same as 
the hourly fee charged to the retaining party.  That presumption is 
reasonable.191  A lawyer, for example, does not charge different rates for 
office work versus in-court work; all of that work is part of being a lawyer 
and equally ties up a lawyer’s time.  The same is true of an expert witness 
who voluntarily takes on the professional role of an expert witness and, with 
that, all of the concomitant roles.  The presumption also avoids the risks of 
 
day: “However, with regard to expert witnesses, ‘there may more often be a need for 
additional time—even after the submission of the report required by Rule 26(a)(2)—for full 
exploration of the theories upon which the witness relies.’” (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d) 
advisory committee’s note to 2000 Amendment)). 
 188  See supra Part III.A.2. 
 189  For example, despite the fact that flat fees are disfavored and struck down when 
brought to a court’s attention, the practice remains prevalent.  See Expert Witness Fees: How 
Much Does an Expert Witness Cost?, SEAK, https://blog.seakexperts.com/expert-witness-
fees-how-much-does-an-expert-witness-cost/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2018) (“33% of all expert 
witnesses charge a minimum number of hours for deposition testimony.”). 
 190  Canepa, supra note 2. 
 191  See, e.g., Ball v. LeBlanc, No. 13-00368-BAJ-SCR, 2015 WL 5793929, at *2 (M.D. 
La. Sept. 30, 2015) (“With respect to Balsamo’s deposition testimony, Defendants assert that 
Plaintiffs should only be reimbursed at a rate of $125 per hour because that is the rate that 
Balsamo charged Plaintiffs for his services.” (citing Borel v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 265 F.R.D. 
275, 277 (E.D. La. 2010))). 
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abuse and unfairness to the deposing party.192 Given the lack of any arm’s 
length negotiation, it is all-too-easy for the expert to charge the deposing 
party a higher rate, such that the deposing party ends up effectively 
subsidizing the expert’s work for the retaining party. 
Of equal importance, the presumption of a single hourly rate—rather 
than a range of rates—provides a bright-line so that litigants have clarity 
regarding what rate is “reasonable,” and courts need not expend resources 
examining the minutiae of whether and why a billed rate is reasonable.  To 
the extent an expert demands a higher hourly rate for deposition time than 
for writing her report, the retaining party is in the best position to be aware 
of that at the time the expert is retained.  It can attempt to negotiate the 
expert’s rates so that the expert charges a single hourly rate, accept 
responsibility for making up any difference in the permitted rate of recovery, 
or select a different expert. 
The amendment also effectively will require that a party who wants the 
benefit of the fee shifting rule must have compensated the expert at an hourly 
rate rather than flat fee.  While this undoubtedly will create problems for 
experts whose practice is to bill a flat fee for their work on behalf of the 
retaining party,193 that downside is outweighed by the fact that the hourly 
rate an expert charges the retaining party is by far the best measure of the 
expert’s actual hourly rate.  The risk of unfairness to the deposing party from 
the expert having an hourly rate that is, for all intents and purposes, only 
charged to the opposing party is significant.  Further, because that hourly 
rate will serve as a presumption for the rate that is reasonable, many disputes 
will be eliminated. 
 
 
 192  See Garnier v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., No. 04CV1825(NGG)(KAM), 2006 WL 
1085080, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2006) (“[A] Court should ‘balance’ a party’s need for 
competent experts with the need to protect the opposing party from being ‘unfairly burdened 
by excessive ransoms which produce windfalls for the [party’s] experts.’” (quoting Magee v. 
Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 172 F.R.D. 627, 645 (E.D.N.Y. 1997))). 
 193  For example, doctors who perform independent medical exams (“IME”) and medical 
record reviews often charge a flat fee for their work rather than an hourly rate.  See Alex 
Babitsky, How Much Does an IME (Independent Medical Examination) Cost?, IME: 
RESOURCES & TRAINING, https://independentmedicalexamtraining.com/how-much-does-an-
ime-independent-medical-examination-cost/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2018) (“A slight majority of 
independent medical examiners charge a flat fee for their IMEs.”).  While these doctors would 
have to change this practice in order to have their deposition fees shifted, that is not a bad 
thing overall.  A doctor that performs an IME, for example, may charge a $1000 flat fee and 
issue a report that necessitates that the retaining party conduct a five-hour deposition.  If the 
expert charges a rate of $500 per hour for a deposition, that means that the deposing party is 
paying 2.5 times as much as the retaining party.  That is not only an imbalance that makes 
one question whether each party is paying their true portion of the doctor’s work, but it also 
significantly lessens the concern that the deposing party is “getting for free” what the other 
party had to pay for.  
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Because preparation time and travel time are not covered by the 
amended rule, there is no need to address whether an expert’s hourly rate for 
travel should be the same as the rate for work performed.  That change to the 
rule will eliminate the inconsistencies among courts on this issue and provide 
much-needed uniformity in the federal courts. 
C. Timing of Payments 
As discussed, issues of timing regarding when fees must be paid and 
when fees may be billed consume a substantial portion of litigants’ and 
courts’ time.194  That is wholly unnecessary and there is no reason that the 
rule should not provide clarity regarding the timing issues that routinely 
arise. 
The proposed change creates bright-lines for when fees must be billed 
and when fees must be paid, and it eliminates advance billing.  That is 
consistent with the better approach under the rule’s current language.  The 
prohibition of advance billing also makes sense as a practical matter.  When 
going into a deposition for any witness, whether a lay witness or expert, no 
one typically knows how long the deposition will last.  Thus, there is no 
reliable way to accurately calculate what is a reasonable advance payment.  
If the expert insists on advance payment, that can and should be provided by 
the retaining party with whom the expert has a professional relationship. 
The amended rule also eliminates uncertainty and disputes about when 
fees are due.  It makes the due date enforceable by making the amount due 
automatic and by automatically charging interest on any amount not timely 
paid.195  This practice—having a set due date after which time interest 
accrues—is consistent with other court-ordered payments.196 
D. Make Fee Shifting Contingent on Having an Expert Report 
As discussed, under the current rule, expert deposition fees shift for all 
experts, including those experts that have not provided a report.197  The 
primary justification for fee shifting is the fact that the expert already has 
provided a detailed report—and has done so at the expense of the retaining 
party—thus reducing or even eliminating the need for a deposition.  When 
that justification does not exist because there is no report, it does not make 
sense and is not fair to shift expert deposition fees. 
 
 
 194  See supra Part III.B. 
 195  While the amount of requested fees is presumptively considered reasonable, a party 
may file a resistance to a fee request. When that happens, payment is not due until the court 
decides the dispute and issues an order.  See supra Part V.A. 
 196  See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (2012).   
 197  See supra Part III.B.3. 
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For the same reason, fee shifting is not justified when the expert has 
failed to provide a complete and accurate report.  A report that is deficient—
i.e., does not comply with the disclosure requirements—is, in many respects, 
similar to having no report.  It makes a deposition unquestionably necessary 
in order to learn the information that should have been, but was not, 
disclosed.  It also makes it likely that the deposition will take longer insofar 
as counsel will have to explore information that the expert failed to provide.  
In addition, when a report is deficient, the retaining party by definition has 
not paid for the expert to do work that the expert was supposed to do, and 
there thus exists far less “potential unfairness” that the deposing party will 
free ride off work for which the retaining party paid. 
Finally, by categorically denying fee shifting when a report is deficient, 
the rule provides an incentive for the retaining party and expert to comply 
with the disclosure requirement.  It is not uncommon for an expert to fail to 
include some required information, such as the list of prior testimony.  That 
failure is significant because it precludes the opposing party from exploring 
that prior work in the deposition and eventually at trial.  The solution that 
some courts have taken—to simply reduce the hours billed for time 
attributable to the failure to provide a complete disclosure—is inadequate.  It 
not only sends the wrong message and provides poor incentives to the 
retaining party, but it also results in courts having to make the case-by-case 
determination of how much of a reduction in hours is reasonable.  That is not 
only time consuming when it happens but also costly enough that some 
deposing parties will just pay the excess amount because it is less expensive.  
This revised rule incentivizes a party to comply with the basic disclosure 
requirements and places the burden where it belongs—on the party that has 
failed to comply rather than on the deposing party. 
E. Process for Fee Disputes 
As discussed, the current rule is silent as to how litigants should handle 
disputes about fees.198  That leaves uncertain why a party has the obligation 
to file a motion if a disagreement occurs, thereby creating the unintended 
consequence of the “reasonable” party (or at least the party that ultimately 
prevails) having to decide whether to incur the costs of filing a motion, and 
sometimes deciding not to.  When the latter occurs, the unreasonable party—
i.e., the expert that is charging unreasonable fees or the deposing party who 
is refusing to pay reasonable fees—may end up being rewarded in their 
unreasonable position. 
On the other hand, the current rule’s silence also may imply that there 
is no basis to challenge a fee request.  Certainly aspects of the rule would 
 
 198  See supra Part III.B.3. 
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counter this implication, such as if fees cannot be challenged then why does 
the rule only provide for payment of “reasonable fees.”  As the cases in this 
area demonstrate, however, the tendency of courts is to rubber stamp fee 
requests rather than apply scrutiny, and having a set process creates balance 
and signals the courts’ role. 
Because the rule streamlines the question of what fees shift and how 
much, it is likely that parties will only rarely have to involve courts in 
disputes about fees.  What constitutes a reasonable fee should almost never 
be disputed given the rule’s bright-lines and presumptions.  In instances in 
which it is, however, the rule provides the process by which the fee should 
be challenged.  Further, that process does not automatically penalize the 
party that challenges the fees, nor does it automatically reward that party.  
Instead, the rule provides that a court must determine if the challenge was 
frivolous in its order.  If it was, then interest is charged from the date the 
payment was due absent the challenge.  If it was not frivolous, though, then 
the party is not charged with interest. 
Related to the fee dispute process, the amended rule should provide in 
the advisory notes that disputes arising under this rule are subject to the 
provisions of the discovery sanctions rule.199  That means that, if a litigant—
whether the retaining party or the deposing party—takes a frivolous position 
that causes the other party to incur attorneys’ fees, a court should consider 
that action in the context of the sanctions rule.  While an advisory note of 
that sort normally would not be necessary, here it is based upon the tendency 
under the current rule to not award sanctions when the retaining party acts 
unreasonably.200  Because the fee shifting rule should incentivize all parties 
to take reasonable positions, an advisory note that makes this clear would be 
beneficial.  That is particularly true under the revised rule which provides 






 199  See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(3)(A). 
 200  In Rote v. Zel Custom Manufacturing LLC, the retaining party argued that “that the 
law is ‘clear in this district that an expert’s deposition preparation time and travel time are 
reimbursable[,]’” while citing an authority in that federal district court.  No. 2:13-cv-1189, 
2018 WL 2093619, at *1 (S.D. Ohio May 7, 2018).  Thus, the retaining party sought 
“attorney’s fees for the costs incurred in bringing [a] Motion” to get its expert’s preparation 
time and travel time paid.  Id.  Although it appears that the law in that particular district was 
well-settled, the court nonetheless refused to award the retaining party the attorney’s fee it 
incurred in bringing the motion, denying the motion “as unjust under the circumstances.”  Id. 
at *6 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(iii)). 
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F. Move “Manifest Injustice” Language to the Part of the Rule to 
Which it Relates 
As discussed, the rule’s prefatory language of “unless manifest injustice 
would result” is more problematic than not.  Further, without a definition of 
“manifest injustice,” it also is oddly out-of-place in a rule that pertains to 
shifting of an expert’s discovery fees, and it sends the wrong signal to 
litigants and courts about the courts’ role.  Thus, the revised rule makes two 
changes.  First, it moves the phrase “unless manifest justice would result” to 
the part of the rule to which it relates—the payment of fees.  That is 
consistent with the direction in the advisory notes to the current rule in 
making clear that the standard has nothing to do with whether the fees are 
objectively “reasonable,” but rather pertains solely to the deposing party’s 
ability to pay.  Second, and related to that, the rule expressly qualifies 
“manifest justice” as relating to a party’s ability to pay. 
The amended rule also adds in language to clarify the fee dispute 
process when a party contends it should not have to pay because such 
“manifest injustice would result.”  Specifically, it makes clear that the 
process for objecting to a fee request on “manifest injustice” grounds is the 
same as the process for any other objection to fees. 
G. Overall Benefits of the Proposed Amendments to the Rule 
Taken together, these proposed changes to the rule will result in a fee 
shifting that is not only clear, but that also better effectuates its purpose. 
First, litigants will be on notice of what fees are covered by the rule as 
well as the process for fee shifting.  With a shared understanding of the 
contours of the rule, very few disputes should arise under the rule.  Moreover, 
when such disputes do arise, the process for handling them will be clear, with 
consequences attached to unreasonable demands or refusals under the rule.  
Put differently, the fee shifting rule will be clear and, on the flip side, litigants 
will have an incentive to play by the rule. 
In addition, because the rule provides bright lines regarding what is 
covered and what is presumptively reasonable, the rule will require little 
court involvement.  And when court involvement is necessary, it will be 
streamlined.  Courts will not have to interpret ambiguous provisions of the 
rule. 
Moreover, the rule’s parameters are fair.  By ensuring that only fees 
that are controlled by and of benefit to the deposing party are shifted, the rule 
better serves its purpose.  A rule that automatically shifts fee must be fine-
tuned to ensure it properly incentivizes the parties. 
Finally, these changes will provide uniformity in the rule.  For almost 
twenty-five years, such uniformity has been lacking in this rule’s 
implementation.  Aside from the fact that disputes about the rule’s meaning 
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have been costly, such disputes have resulted in different courts adopting 
conflicting interpretations of the rule.  As a practical matter, that has meant 
that the types of fees and the amount of fees shifted has been contingent on 
which federal court happens to hear the case. 
 
